The Political Logic of Disintegration: Seven Lessons from the Soviet Collapse. CEPS Essay (No. 1), September 2012

In short, the European Union, as we know it, no longer exists. The very foundations on which it was built are eroding. Shared memories of the Second World War have faded away – half the 15- and 16-year-olds in German high schools do not know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union has stripped away the geopolitical rationale for European unity. The democratic welfare state that was at the heart of the post-war political consensus is under siege by, among other things, sheer demographics. And the prosperity that bolstered the European project’s political legitimacy is vanishing. More than six out of ten Europeans believe that the lives of today’s children will be more difficult than those of people from their own generation. Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU’s disintegration? Should Europeans make the mistake of taking the Union for granted? Should they assume that the Union would not collapse because it should not collapse? Here, Europe’s capacity to learn from the Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its leaders’ ability to manage a similar mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse. The game of disintegration is primarily a political one driven much more by the perceptions and misperceptions of the political actors than simply by the constellation of the structural factors – institutional and economic.

The Russian economy under Putin: Growth factors and impediments to economic development. OSW Study 20/2005

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

Effects of Economic Factors on Adoption of Robotics and Consequences of Automation for Productivity Growth of Dairy Farms. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 32, December 2012

In the long term, productivity and especially productivity growth are necessary conditions for the survival of a farm. This paper focuses on the technology choice of a dairy farm, i.e. the choice between a conventional and an automatic milking system. Its aim is to reveal the extent to which economic rationality explains investing in new technology. The adoption of robotics is further linked to farm productivity to show how capital-intensive technology has affected the overall productivity of milk production. The empirical analysis applies a probit model and an extended Cobb-Douglas-type production function to a Finnish farm-level dataset for the years 2000–10. The results show that very few economic factors on a dairy farm or in its economic environment can be identified to affect the switch to automatic milking. Existing machinery capital and investment allowances are among the significant factors. The results also indicate that the probability of investing in robotics responds elastically to a change in investment aids: an increase of 1% in aid would generate an increase of 2% in the probability of investing. Despite the presence of non-economic incentives, the switch to robotic milking is proven to promote productivity development on dairy farms. No productivity growth is observed on farms that keep conventional milking systems, whereas farms with robotic milking have a growth rate of 8.1% per year. The mean rate for farms that switch to robotic milking is 7.0% per year. The results show great progress in productivity growth, with the average of the sector at around 2% per year during the past two decades. In conclusion, investments in new technology as well as investment aids to boost investments are needed in low-productivity areas where investments in new technology still have great potential to increase productivity, and thus profitability and competitiveness, in the long run.

Can Policy Make Us Happier? Individual characteristics socioeconomic factors, and life satisfaction in Central and Eastern Europe. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 22/November 2011

In the last decade, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have witnessed a rapid economic convergence vis-à-vis Western Europe. However, this rapid growth has not been matched by a similarly rapid increase in life satisfaction, which has remained low in the European context. This paper sets out to address this conundrum, by looking at the individual and macro-level determinants of individual life satisfaction in ten CEE countries. The results highlight that while Central and Eastern Europeans share the same individual determinants of happiness as people in the West (despite some significant cross-country variation), macroeconomic and institutional differences are the key factors behind the lack of convergence in life satisfaction. On the macroeconomic side, GDP growth is still a source of increasing well-being, but the happiness bonus associated with it is becoming smaller. The different levels of individual happiness in CEE are therefore mostly determined by institutional factors such as corruption, government spending and decentralisation, making policies aimed at enhancing institutional quality capable of bringing about substantial improvements in the overall life satisfaction of the people in the region.