The Re-emergence of Russia and its Collision Course with Europe. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 4, March 2014

From the Introduction. In order to understand the historical roots of the current geopolitical confrontation between the EU and Russia, we have to go back to the end of the Cold War and to the catastrophic decade that it was followed by in Russian history. The dissolution of the USSR imposed serious economic hardship for Russia and for all the ex-communist East-European states. Russia was the hardest hit amongst them, as the center of the USSR's economic system it suffered most from the dissolution of regional economic ties. This crisis was just deepened by the IMF's privatization and reform campaign, which imposed austerity measures and state-asset privatization as a “shock-therapy” answer to the country's economic problems. This policy package did nothing to save Russia from economic collapse (which eventually happened in 1998), the only thing it achieved was an even stronger social and economic crisis and the enrichment of the rent-seeking ex-communist top bureaucrats by state-assets, which were sold out under-priced through diverse channels of corruption

Capitalism without Capitalists? A Bottom-Up View of Industrial Transformation in East Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.1, 1999

Research on the industrial transition in East Germany and its outcomes has long focused on the strategy of the Treuhand­ anstalt (IHA). According to institutionalists, David Stark and Lazlo Brust!: (1998), the powerful position of the German privatization agency was not only a result of German unification but also a function of a pathway rooted in the institutional peculiarities of the East German economy before 1989. This paper shows that neither a simple top-down perspective nor the pathway approach, as Stark and Brust!: suggested, are adequate for explaining the internal dynamic of enterprise transformation as well as the outcomes of this process. First of all, the dissolution of the former organizational structures and hierarchies was less coordinated by the 1HA than is often assumed. Often Kombinates fell apart more quickly from below than they could be dismantled from above since enterprises or their units chose the exit­ option and had good reasons to do so. Secondly, although the privatization by the 1HA resulted in the clear dominance of Western investors, the new ownership structure of East German industry as a whole could be characterized as a "capitalism without (East German) capitalists." In fact, what exists in East Germany is rather a kind of "small business capitalism" (KleinbetriebsknpitalifmllS) in which small-and medium-sized producers dominate the landscape. Finally, there was no single starting point in 1989. Two different industrial orders shaped the industrial history of the East German regions which were not destroyed between 1945-89, but rather transformed into the state socialist production system. It can be shown that these older historical patterns are relevant for transition and their outcomes as well.