42 resultados para POLITICAL COMPETITION
em Archive of European Integration
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None.
Resumo:
While many Eurosceptic parties in Europe achieved historical successes in this year’s EP elections, Finland’s populist Finns Party was unable to fulfil its own high expectations. With the eurozone crisis at least temporarily subsiding and Finland’s own economy struggling, the party has been unable to find a new electoral trump card. Facing a changed political climate and stiffer competition, the party is currently toning down its criticism of the EU, as indicated by its recent decision to join the British Tories in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group.
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As elsewhere in Europe and around the world, the discourse of globalization in the United Kingdom—the particular representation of the world as undergoing an epochal shift away from the traditional autonomy of the nation-state—has powerfully reshaped political debate. And this has had important distributional effects on the balance of power in the political party system, most notably in the return to power of the Labour Party as “New Labour” under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. But while it is known that articulations of globalization are embedded in the political system, a systematic analysis linking such discourse with party competition is lacking. In this paper, I propose that many features of the globalist language invoked by New Labour can be explained in terms of concrete strategic aims. Working with concepts of “heresthetics” and “bricolage” drawn from a synthesis of literatures, I illustrate this approach through several representative texts. These findings are then used to make predictions about the kind of globalization discourse to expect in the communications of two nationalist parties in the UK—“least likely” cases for globalism—which can be explored further as part of a larger research program.
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Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.
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In 2012, the European Union adopted a transformational change to its banking policy for the Eurozone. It dropped the model of decentralized supervision and regulatory competition between countries, and replaced it with a single supervisor and harmonization. Transferring banking supervision to the ECB also alters the existing constitutional order. The policy process leading to this transformational change was rapid and highly political, which was different compared to earlier incremental changes to banking policy. Kingdon's model, whereby policy entrepreneurs seize opportunities at times when the independent streams of solutions, problems and politics converge, partly explains this transformation. The study of EU banking policy suggests, however, that the multiple streams framework should pay more attention to the way in which entrepreneurs engineer fluctuations within the streams and thereby contribute to creating opportunities for change. This paper identifies the ECB as an effective entrepreneur which also played an active role in political bargaining.
Resumo:
After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.
Resumo:
In most EU member states, the business services industry has booked no productivity growth during the last two decades. The industry’s performance in the other member states was weaker than that of its US counterparts. Exploring what may be causing this productivity stagnation, this policy brief reports that weak competition has contributed to the continuing malaise in European business services. The study analyzed the persistence (over time) of firm-level inefficiencies. The evidence further suggests that competition between small firms and large firms in business services is weak. Markets for business services work best in countries with flexible regulation on employment change and with low regulatory costs for firms that start up or close down a business. Countries that are more open to foreign competition perform better in terms of competitive selection and productivity. The policy simulations in this paper show that greater import openness strengthens competition in business services markets. The largest positive impact comes from lower regulatory barriers for growing and shrinking firms. More particularly, competitive selection would be fostered by a reduction of administrative and regulatory costs related to labour contracts, bankruptcy and start-up requirements. A key element of the European Commission’s Europe-2020 strategy is the Single European Market for Services. Business services form one of the largest industries in Europe – and given its productivity stagnation, it deserves to be a priority target of the Europe-2020 strategy. Improving the way the business services market functions may have large positive knock-on effects for the EU economy.