Does the Stockholm Programme matter? The struggles over ownership of AFSJ multiannual programming. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 51/December 2012

Does the 2009 Stockholm Programme matter? This paper addresses the controversies experienced at EU institutional levels as to ‘who’ should have ownership of the contours of the EU’s policy and legislative multiannual programming in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape. It examines the struggles around the third multiannual programme on the AFSJ, i.e. the Stockholm Programme, and the dilemmas affecting its implementation. The latest affair to emerge relates to the lack of fulfilment by the European Commission of the commitment to provide a mid-term evaluation of the Stockholm Programme’s implementation by mid-2012, as requested by both the Council and the European Parliament. This paper shifts the focus to a broader perspective and raises the following questions: Is the Stockholm Programme actually relevant? What do the discussions behind its implementation tell us about the new institutional dynamics affecting European integration on the AFSJ? Does the EU actually need a new (post- Stockholm) multiannual programme for the period 2015–20? And last, what role should the EP play in legislative and policy programming in order to further strengthen the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU’s AFSJ?

Disclosure of Leniency Materials: A Bridge between Public and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law. Research Paper in Law 08/2013, December

The disclosure of leniency materials held by competition authorities has recently been under the spot. On the one hand, these documents could greatly help cartel victims to prove the damage and the causation link when filing damage actions against cartelists. On the other hand, future cartelists could be deterred from applying for leniency since damage actions could be brought as a result of the information submitted by themselves. Neither the current legislation nor the case law have attained yet to sufficiently clarify how to deal with this clash of interests. Our approach obviously attempts to strike a balance between both interests. But not only that. We see the current debate as a great opportunity to boost the private enforcement of antitrust law through the positive spillovers of leniency programmes. We hence propose to build a bridge between the public and the private enforcement by enabling a partial disclosure of the documents.

Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market. Report of the CEPS Digital Forum. June 2013

The scope and enforcement of copyright in the digital environment have been among the most complex and controversial subjects tackled by lawmakers all over the world for the last decade. Due to the ubiquitous use of digital technology, modern regulation of copyright inherently touches on numerous areas of law and social and economic policy, including communications privacy and Internet governance. Modernising the EU’s copyright framework is considered a key step towards achieving the goal of an EU Digital Single Market in the context of the ‘Digital Agenda for Europe’, an initiative launched by the European Commission in May 2010. How can the EU make copyright fit for purpose in the Internet age? What are the most suitable and realistic policy options to achieve the objective of a Digital Single Market in the creative content sectors? To give comprehensive answers to these questions, the CEPS Digital Forum formed a Task Force on Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market to foster a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the major challenges for copyright law in the online content sector today. Drawing on the discussions and input gathered by the Task Force, this report contains the conclusions and policy recommendations organised around three main themes: licensing rules and practices in the online music and film sectors, the definition and implementation of copyright exceptions in the digital environment and the present and future of online copyright enforcement in Europe.