3 resultados para Organisation non gouvernementale
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
From the Introduction. According to Article 220 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) “each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed”. The “pre-Nice” allocation of jurisdiction between the two Community courts can be summarized as follows. At Court of Justice level, mention should first of all be made of references for a preliminary ruling. A national court, in a case pending before it, can - or in some circumstances must - refer to the Court of Justice a question relating to the interpretation of provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary Community law, or relating to the validity of provisions of secondary Community law.1 Moreover, the Court of Justice ensures the observance of the law in the context of actions for annulment or failure to act brought before it by the Community institutions, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) and the Member States.2 These actions concern, respectively, the legality of an act of secondary Community law and the legality of the failure of the institution concerned to adopt such act. The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in actions brought by the Commission or by a Member State relating to the infringement of Community law by a Member State (hereinafter infringement actions)3 and in actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by Member States against the Community.4 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals which can be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the CFI.5
Resumo:
Introduction. The idea that “merit” should be the guiding principle of judicial selections is a universal principle, unlikely to be contested in whatever legal system. What differs considerably across legal cultures, however, is the way in which “merit” is defined. For deeper cultural and historical reasons, the current definition of “merit” in the process of judicial selections in the Czech Republic, at least in the way it is implemented in the institutional settings, is an odd mongrel. The old technocratic Austrian judicial heritage has in some aspects merged with, in others was altered or destroyed, by the Communist past. After 1989, some aspects of the judicial organisation were amended, with the most problematic elements removed. Furthermore, several old as well as new provisions relating to the judiciary were struck down by the Constitutional Court. However, apart from these rather haphazard interventions, there has been neither a sustained discussion as to how a new judicial architecture and system of judicial appointments ought to look like nor much of broader, conceptual reform in this regard. Thus, some twenty five years after the Velvet Revolution of 1989, the guiding principles for judicial selection and appointments are still a debate to be had.
Resumo:
The situation of the third sector in Russia, i.e. the civil society structures independent from the state, is worsening on a regular basis. The Kremlin’s actions aimed at paralysing and destroying the independent non-governmental sector seen over the past four years have been presented as part of a struggle for the country’s sovereignty. This is above all a consequence of the Russian government’s efforts to take full control of the socio-political situation in the country while it also needs to deal with the geopolitical confrontation with the West and the worsening economic crisis. The policy aimed against non-governmental organisations is depriving the public of structures for self-organisation, protection of civil rights and the means of controlling the ever more authoritarian government. At the same time, the Kremlin has been depriving itself of channels of co-operation and communication with the public and antagonising the most active citizens. The restrictive measures the Kremlin has taken over the past few years with regard to NGOs prove that Russian decision-makers believe that any social initiative independent of the government may give rise to unrest, which is dangerous for the regime, and – given the economic slump – any unrest brings unnecessary political risk.