Towards a professional army. Changes to the structure of the officer cadre and the manning system of the Russian armed forces. OSW Commentary No. 73, 2012-03-28

The structure of the Russian army’s personnel has undergone a major transformation in recent years. The Armed Forces are no longer a downsized continuation of the Soviet-era mass army, but are gradually becoming a de facto professional army in which conscription, now employed on a diminishing scale, will primarily constitute a first step towards a continued professional military career. The cornerstone for the process of professionalisation has been laid by a personnel reform which cut the number of officer posts by nearly half and considerably restricted the recruitment of new officers, thus restoring traditional proportions to the structure of the officer corps. The plans to ultimately implement a manning system based predominantly on contract service are a natural consequence of these changes. The ongoing professionalisation of the Russian Armed Forces should be treated as a conscious effort which is mainly necessitated by global trends: despite the demographic changes taking place, Russia could still maintain an army with a declared strength of one million soldiers, most of them conscripts.

Geen leger, is onbetaalbaar = No Belgian armed forces is unaffordable. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 61, February 2015

In this Security Policy Brief Jo Coelmont examines the challenges Belgium is facing at present. On the one hand there is the declared political objective to henceforth provide its defence forces with the means of achieving all of its tasks and, furthermore, to develop a new Strategic Plan, while taking decisions on replacing its current fleet of F16 fighter aircraft and determine strategic orientations on the replacement of frigates, mine hunter vessels and other major equipment programmes. On the other hand, the already taken austerity measures impose severe structural cuts on its defence budget for the upcoming five years. In this context the author is proposing some « dos and don’ts«.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

La protection des données à caractère personnel dans le cadre des activités d’une mission civile de gestion de crise ou la recherche de « l’inaccessible étoile » ? Data Protection within the context of one ESDP Mission - The search for the unreachable star

La question de la protection des données à caractère personnel posée dans le cadre des activités d’assistance et de soutien des missions civiles de gestion de crise ne semble guère avoir suscité l’intérêt des instances en charge de leur gestion et ce en dépit de son importance majeure au regard des tâches exécutées quotidiennement par les agents de ces missions dans le domaine de la coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale. S’appuyant sur une expérience de terrain, l’auteur s’efforcera, dans ces lignes, de démontrer la nécessité d’entamer une réflexion de fond sur ce sujet afin, le cas échéant, de prendre les initiatives utiles destinées à porter remède aux difficultés qui, en ce domaine, pourraient apparaître.