From supervision to resolution: next steps on the road to European Banking Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/04, February 2012

The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.

The European Citizen's Initiative: next big thing or new false good idea? Egmont Paper No. 59, July 2013

From the Introduction. One innovative element of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). At the time, this was sometimes hailed as a fundamental change in the European institutional system. A few years after the entry into force of the Treaty, however, much less is heard about this “first truly transnational instrument of modern direct democracy”, this “revolution in disguise”, this “very innovative and symbolic” provision. This could seem surprising at first sight. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the implementation of this provision has been remarkably rapid. Meanwhile, new arguments have risen concerning the lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and the lack of connection between the European institutions and the citizens.

Towards ‘EuroNest 2.0’: What should the next European Parliament learn from its predecessor? CEPS Policy Brief No. 300, 1 October 2013

The development and functioning of the EU-Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly (EuroNest PA) is the focus of this Policy Brief, in which the authors argue that despite organising a number of meetings and adopting several resolutions in the past two years, the Assembly is failing to reach its objectives of promoting economic and political integration between the EU and the Eastern Partners. Three main problems are considered in this paper: i) the criticism of the European Parliament for being inconsistent about the conditions under which countries can send delegates ii) the fact that the parliamentary meetings are too short and infrequent, and iii) the observation that the Eastern Partners focus too much on national and bilateral issues, thus failing to engage in multilateral dialogue. A number of recommendations are put forward to enhance the effectiveness of the Assembly.

Egypt and the EU: where next? CEPS Commentary, 4 November 2013

EU diplomats are still struggling to keep abreast of events in Egypt. A reconstruction of the police state – bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE – is the exact opposite of what the EU tried to achieve under the Presidency of Mohamed Morsi, namely long-term stability based on respect for democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore perhaps surprising that the EU has so far not imposed any sanctions against members of the military regime led by General al-Sisi. Instead, it is trying to build an inclusive political dialogue to restore a democratic process. Is this what the EU should do? The answer is, quite plainly, ‘Yes’– at least for the moment.

Next steps toward a final deal with Iran. CEPS Policy Brief No. 316, 14 February 2014

On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.