A New Deal for growth and jobs in the Eurozone revisited. EPC Commentary, 27 January 2014

At the EPC breakfast on 28 January, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde will launch a book on Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery, containing detailed policy analysis and recommendations. The book is a further sign that there is now wide-spread recognition that it is high time for Europe to take more action to deliver jobs and growth.

The New Deal with the United Kingdom: the Downside of Flexibility. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 38/2016

This paper examines the proposals listed by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in response to the letter sent by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, asking for a fresh settlement concerning the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. The paper reviews the nature and possible consequences of the “substantial changes” that were demanded in the areas of economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration.

Cameron’s reality check on Europe. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 38, 15 April 2014

Ever since Prime Minister David Cameron made his major speech on Europe on 23 January 2013, in which he argued for some kind of new deal between the UK and the EU, the rest of the EU as well as the British public have been wondering what he would actually propose in operational terms. On 15 March 2014, the Prime Minister offered at least an interim reply to these questions in an article in the Daily Telegraph newspaper. This paper extracts from the Daily Telegraph article the main ideas that the Prime Minister advances. In all, 10 propositions are identified, presented in the precise language used, followed by an appraisal. The article has not attracted so much attention, mainly because its content is not particularly sensational, but that is its real importance and quality. It points the way towards resolving what otherwise would mean a huge political crisis for the UK and the EU. The Prime Minister gave the overall impression that he is not now heading towards making an impossibly difficult list of demands. On the contrary, an informed and moderate realism seems to be in the making. The package outlined in this paper could be sold in Brussels. There would then have to be a robust communications campaign to sell it to the British public. This paper is part of a series for a CEPS-EPIN project on “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative”, which is pegged to an ambitious ongoing exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union. The intention is that this should provide a basis for informed debate before the referendum on the UK remaining in the EU or not, which is scheduled for 2017.

The Review of the Europe 2020 Strategy: From austerity to prosperity? CEPS Policy Brief No. 322, 28 October 2014

The future of Europe 2020 lies in its ability to become the protagonist of a new season in EU policy, in which countries can apply for more flexibility only if they can prove both structural reform and good governance, argues the author. By establishing a ‘new deal’ among member states, an improved Europe 2020 strategy can help Europe to complete its transition from austerity to prosperity. This Policy Brief makes the case for approaching the mid-term review of Europe 2020 on three different levels: i) the revision and update of the content of the Europe 2020 strategy, including its objectives, targets and major flagship initiatives; ii) the reform of the governance of the strategy; and iii) the repositioning of the strategy at the core of EU policy. The content of the strategy should be revised to include initiatives on infrastructure, the internal market and administrative capacity at all levels of government. The author sets out a number of policy recommendations for the European Commission and the member states to help realise these objectives.

Towards a New (European Research) Deal: The Case for Enhanced Fiscal Policy Coordination on Research and Innovation. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 20/2008

The paper reviews the evolution of research and innovation in the EU and assesses how current policies and programmes have influenced the development of Europe's research landscape. Based on existing literature, evaluation reports and practice, the paper critically examines the effectiveness of current European research funding instruments in a context of open innovation and in the presence of global spillovers. It therefore develops a subsidiarity test to assess whether current rationales still prove sufficient to justify policy intervention in this area. The paper sheds light on how to improve the effectiveness of EU action by enriching it by the use of coordinated fiscal policy for research funding. This will constitute an incentive to genuine bottom-up research, development and innovation (R&D&I) and a stimulus to local investments in innovation. The paper also assesses the potentials of a reinforced open method of coordination as well as a review of state aid law in the field of research funding in the EU.

Towards a fresh deal for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their neighbourhood policies: 15 steps. CEPS Commentary, 29 May 2014

Following the convincing election of Petro Poroshenko as Ukraine’s new President, Michael Emerson puts forward 15 steps with a view to creating a fresh start for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their neighbourhood policies.

Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU’s new leadership. EPC Challenge Europe Issue 22, September 2014

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE AVAILABLE ON THE ARCHIVE AS SEPARATE ARTICLES. There has been a lot of attention on the current transition of power taking place in Brussels. The new EU leadership will be confronted with a number of internal and external challenges. They will have deal with economic stagnation, the negative effects of fragmentation and the need to increase the Union's legitimacy. There is no better moment to take stock of the ‘state of the Union’ and to look ahead into the next European political cycle (2014-2019), focusing not on personalities but on content: what challenges do we face and what should the EU focus on in the coming years? These new beginnings will encounter new challenges, and who better understands the issues than some of the key players in European politics. Challenge Europe brings these players together and explores what social, political and economic challenges are facing Europe, and its’ citizens.

The need for a New Pact. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU’s new leadership, September 2014.

During the last political cycle (2009-2014), the European Union (EU) went through the worst crisis of its history. In the months and years to come, the new EU leadership and Member States will have to take major decisions if Europeans want to sustainably overcome the crisis, prepare themselves for the manifold internal and external tests ahead, and provide the grounds for Europe to exploit more of its potential and meet the needs and expectations of citizens. The outcome of this venture is unclear considering the 'state of the Union' and the current mood in Brussels and national capitals. But one thing seems rather certain: to generate active support from citizens and elites, future developments at European and national level need to be driven by confidence and renewed ambition and not, as in the past years, by fear first – fear of a euro implosion; or of an involuntary exit from the common currency with unforeseeable consequences. In order to take strategic decisions about the Union's future, there is a need to identify and address the key challenge(s) and provide a coherent and holistic response on the grounds of an ambitious but at the same time pragmatic 'package deal', taking into account the diverging interests of Member States and their citizens. But what is the state of affairs, what is the key strategic challenge and how can the new EU leadership cope with it in the next political cycle (2014-2019)?

State of the Union and key challenges for Europe's future. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

In the last five years deep cracks have appeared in the European project. The 'euro-area crisis' triggered by a severe global financial and economic crisis has put European integration to a major test, more profound than ever before. The experience of recent years has revealed and exacerbated significant deficiencies in the European Union's (EU) economic and political construction. At time it has cast doubt on fundamentals of the European project and raised questions about whether Europe will be able to deal effectively not only with the immediate crisis, but also with the many other serious socio-economic, politico-institutional, societal and global challenges that Europe is and will be confronted with. At the start of a new institutional-political cycle (2014-2019) and while the crisis situation has for a number of reasons improved significantly since the summer of 2012, at least in systemic terms, the Union's new leadership and Member States will now have to take strategic decisions about the future of European integration.

Oligarchs after the Maidan: the old system in a 'new' Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 162, 2015-02-16

From the Introduction. There have been major changes in the balance of forces among the key Ukrainian oligarchs, representatives of big business with strong political influence, since the victory of the Maidan revolution. However, these changes have not undermined the oligarchic system per se. Over the past decade or so, the oligarchs have been key players in Ukrainian politics and economy, and they have retained this position until the present. One of the effects of the change of the government in Kyiv and the war in the Donbas was the elimination of the influence of ‘the family’ – the people from Viktor Yanukovych’s inner circle who formed the most expansive oligarchic group in Ukraine at the time of his presidency. The influence of Rinat Akhmetov, the country’s wealthiest man, has also weakened significantly; Akhmetov was one of the most influential people in Ukraine for more than ten years, partly owing to his close bonds with Yanukovych. Dmytro Firtash’s group has also lost a great deal of its influence since Firtash was arrested in Austria in March 2014.

Cardiff: Birthplace of a new Transatlantic Narrative? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 57, July 2014

Cardiff has the potential to turn into a “great meeting”, if the focus is on forging a new and attractive narrative to underpin a solid transatlantic security relationship, in which NATO finds its place. But Europeans must become serious on defence – and not only because the US asks for it. Otherwise, the EU and for sure the European States will become strategic bystanders and even objects of great power competition. That would be a real game-changer. That is why, in Cardiff, “we” ought to be ambitious enough to deal with the real issues, including the relationship between NATO and the CSDP.

Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Controlled ‘Europeanisation’? The KMW–Nexter merger and the Germany’s new strategy for the arms industry. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 180/26.08.2015

On 29 July a deal was signed in Paris concerning a merger between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), Germany’s largest manufacturer of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery systems, and its French counterpart Nexter. The new holding formed as a result of the merger will be Europe’s largest producer of arms systems for land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group in the aerospace industry. While work on finalising the merger was underway, the German government was developing a new strategy for Germany’s arms industry, which was published on 9 June 2015. The strategy’s provisions show that German politicians, despite holding negative opinions on previous mergers between German arms companies and foreign businesses, have concluded that consolidation at the European level is nonetheless the only way to go. However, the strategy also states that the German government should exercise more influence than previously on the terms and conditions of any such consolidation. To this end, it identified key national technologies which will be supported and protected through various instruments, including also the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on strategic defence co-operation. Such agreements may regulate questions such as the ownership structures of the new companies, the locations for developing technologies and for manufacturing products, subcontractors and exports of jointly developed arms and military equipment. In relation to the KMW–Nexter merger, such a deal between France and Germany is expected to be signed this autumn.