Sustainable Development and Collective Learning: Theory and a European Case Study. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 7/2004

Network governance of collective learning processes is an essential approach to sustainable development. The first section of the article briefly refers to recent theories about both market and government failures that express scepticism about the way framework conditions for market actors are set. For this reason, the development of networks for collective learning processes seems advantageous if new solutions are to be developed in policy areas concerned with long-term changes and a stepwise internalisation of externalities. With regard to corporate actors’ interests, the article shows recent insights from theories about the knowledge-based firm, where the creation of new knowledge is based on the absorption of societal views. This concept shifts the focus towards knowledge generation as an essential element in the evolution of sustainable markets. This involves at the same time the development of new policies. In this context innovation-inducing regulation is suggested and discussed. The evolution of the Swedish, German and Dutch wind turbine industries are analysed based on the approach of governance put forward in this article. We conclude that these coevolutionary mechanisms may take for granted some of the stabilising and orientating functions previously exercised by basic regulatory activities of the state. In this context, the main function of the governments is to facilitate learning processes that depart from the government functions suggested by welfare economics.

Regional health governance: a comparative perspective on EU and ASEAN. EU Centre in Singapore Policy Brief No. 4, June 2012

Globalisation has led to new health challenges for the 21st Century. These challenges have transnational implications and involve a large range of actors and stakeholders. National governments no longer hold the sole responsibility for the health of their people. These changes in health trends have led to the rise of Global Health Governance as a theoretical notion for health policy-making. The Southeast Asian region is particularly prone to public health threats and it is for this reason that this brief looks at the potential of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a regional organisation to take a lead in health cooperation. Through a comparative study between the regional mechanisms for health cooperation of the European Union (EU) and ASEAN, we look at how ASEAN could maximise its potential as a global health actor. Regional institutions and a network of civil society organisations are crucial in relaying global initiatives for health, and ensuring their effective implementation at the national level. While the EU benefits from higher degrees of integration and involvement in the sector of health policy making, ASEAN’s role as a regional body for health governance will depend both on greater horizontal and vertical regional integration through enhanced regional mechanisms and a wider matrix of cooperation.

Industries and Citizens’ Groups Networks in EU Food Policy: The Emergence of ‘Unholy Alliances’ in Multilevel Governance? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 30, September 2013

Food policy is one the most regulated policy fields at the EU level. ‘Unholy alliances’ are collaborative patterns that temporarily bring together antagonistic stakeholders behind a common cause. This paper deals with such ‘transversal’ co-operations between citizens’ groups (NGOs, consumers associations…) and economic stakeholders (food industries, retailers…), focusing on their ambitions and consequences. This paper builds on two case studies that enable a more nuanced view on the perspectives for the development of transversal networks at the EU level. The main findings are that (i) the rationale behind the adoption of collaborative partnerships actually comes from a case-by-case cost/benefit analysis leading to hopes of improved access to institutions; (ii) membership of a collaborative network leads to a learning process closely linked to the network’s performance; and (iii) coalitions can have a better reception — rather than an automatic better access — depending on several factors independent of the stakeholders themselves.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.