Comparative regional perspectives: the Bologna process and higher education attainment. Jean Monnet/Robert Schumann Paper Series Vol 13 No. 11, August 2013

Since 1999, countries have voluntarily chosen to reform their higher education systems to join the European Higher Education Area. This paper compares Bologna Process implementation across four regions within the European Union. While there are 47 countries participating in the Bologna Process, this paper uses statistical analysis to consider 25 of the 28 EU Member States. The time period of analysis is 2000-2011, prior to Croatia’s accession to the EU on 1 July 2013. Across Europe there are inter-regional differences in how the Bologna Process has been implemented and in the political economy contexts that influence higher education reform for policy convergence. There are three explanatory variables in the political economy context: 1. competitive economic pressures and globalization 2. domestic politics at the national level 3. leadership from the supranational European Union that socially constructs regional norms Tertiary education attainment is the dependent variable of interest in this research. The objective of 40%, for 30-34 year olds, is Europe 2020 benchmark target. There are additional higher education reform criteria encompassed in the Bologna Process. These criteria concern Credit and Degree Structure, Quality Assurance, and Recognition of academic degrees among countries in the EHEA. This tertiary education attainment variable, which is of interest in this paper, does not capture the entire implementation process. Nevertheless, it is a measure of one important indicator of success in providing higher education access to populations within the context of democratic governance. This research finds that statistically GDP Per Capita is the most significant variable in relationship to tertiary education attainment across four regional areas in the European Union.

EU immigration trends and policies: Spain and France as case studies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 10, August 2013

From the Introduction. The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht or the Maastricht Treaty, created the European Union (EU) from the existing European Economic Community (EEC.) It was signed by the member states on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993.1 Among its many innovations was the creation of European citizenship, which would be granted to any person who was a citizen of an EU member state. Citizenship, however, is intertwined with immigration, which the Treaty also attempted to address. Policy on visas, immigration and asylum was originally placed under Pillar 3 of the EU, which dealt with Justice and Home Affairs. In 1997, however, the Amsterdam Treaty moved these policies from Pillar 3 to Pillar 1, signaling “a shift toward more supranational decision-making in this area,” as opposed to the intergovernmental method of Pillars 2 and 3.2

The euro before the financial crisis of 2008: an integrating and stabilizing factor. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Vol. 13 No. 9, June 2013

From the Introduction. The main focus of this study is to examine whether the euro has been an economic, monetary, fiscal, and social stabilizer for the Eurozone. In order to do this, the underpinnings of the euro are analysed, and the requirements and benchmarks that have to be achieved, maintained, and respected are tested against the data found in three major statistics data sources: the European Central Bank’s Statistics Data Warehouse (http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/), Economagic (www.economagic.com), and E-signal. The purpose of this work is to analyse if the euro was a stabilizing factor from its inception to the break of the financial crisis in summer 2008 in the European Union. To answer this question, this study analyses a number of indexes to understand the impact of the euro in three markets: (1) the foreign exchange market, (2) the stock market, and the Crude Oil and commodities markets, (3) the money market.

Austeridad fiscal vs gasto ubernamental: historia de la crisis europea = Fiscal austerity versus governmental spending: history of the European crisis. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers Series Vol. 13 No. 8, June 2013

No abstract.

Corporate social responsibility: a European perspective. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 6, June 2013

From the Introduction. CSR grows at different rhythms. CSR varies from continent to continent, country from country, sector from sector and corporation from corporation. The Responsible Competitive Index (RCI) from the UK NGO Accountability and the Brazilian Business School, Fundaçao Dom Cabral, looks at how countries are performing in their efforts to promote responsible business practices and issues periodical indexes about such performances. The RCI’s index for 2007 analysed 108 countries (96% of global GDP). The analysis showed that more advanced economies do better in this area. The top 20 countries, by the ranking order of best performance, were the following: 1 Sweden, 2 Denmark, 3 Finland, 4 Iceland, 5 UK, 6 Norway, 7 New Zealand, 8 Ireland, 9 Australia, 10 Canada, 11 Germany, 12, Netherlands, 13 Switzerland, 14 Belgium, 15 Singapore, 16 Austria, 17 France, 18 USA, 19 Japan, and 20 Hong Kong, etc. However, it is important to bear in mind that advanced economies have often moved their more dirty industries to other parts of the world where there are less stringent environmental and social standards. As a result, other countries may be polluting on their behalf, and the indexes do not factor those in.2

Law practice in a globalized world: the European experience. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 7, June 2013

From the Introduction. In this paper I plan to give a simple overview on how the legal profession is integrating in a globalized world within the European Union (“EU”).

The Arab Spring: where was the EU, and what is its future in the region? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 4, February 2013

From the Introduction. In 2010 the martyring of Mohamed Bouazizi began a ripple of civil uprisings across the Middle East, and would lead to a wave of revolutions that the media would dub the Arab Spring. From North Africa to the Gulf Region, these civil uprisings made major headlines but found little intervention on behalf of world superpowers such as the United States or the European Union. Acting as more of an observer than as an active participant in these revolutions, it would seem that the European Union played a small role in preventing civil unrest, or in aiding in the policing of these oppressive governments. By example of the passive position held by Europe during these revolutions, the EU appears to be ill equipped to handle security issues such as the massive revolutionary chain witnessed across the Mediterranean. Now, however, they have a new opportunity to be involved in a post- Arab Spring Mediterranean. This paper seeks to address some reasons behind the Arab Spring, describe the institutional framework previously and currently in place, as well as to analyze the progress of Europe’s relationship with the Mediterranean by analyzing the EU’s past and current role in the Mediterranean. It will also look at critiques of the EU’s role in the Arab Spring, as well as the opportunities to be taken in the Mediterranean region.

Modelo Europeu como referencia par a integracao na American Latina do seculo XXI = Europe as a model in the integration of Latin American in the 21st century. Jon Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 5, February 2013

No abstract.

Towards a new design of South American integration? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Special Issue January 2013

The design of South American integration is becoming different. This has been quite common in the trajectory of over six decades of initiatives aimed at generating institutional frameworks to facilitate regional integration. However, even when it has become apparent that the previous design is undergoing a new process of change, it would be difficult to predict for how long the one that is beginning to take shape will remain in effect. The experience of recent decades suggests great caution in forecasts that are optimistic about any eventual longevity. Several factors are contributing to this redesign. Some are external to the region while others are endogenous. The combination of these factors will influence the future design of South American integration. If past lessons are correctly capitalized and certain advantage is derived from the leeway provided by a decentralized international system with multiple options, we can anticipate that what will predominate in the region will be multidimensional integration agreements (with political and economic objectives at the same time) and with cross-memberships and commitments. If this were the case, the actual impact on regional governance, social and productive integration and the competitive insertion at a global scale will depend largely on the following factors: the quality and sustainability of the strategy for development and global and regional insertion of each country; the combination of a reasonable degree of flexibility and predictability in the commitments made and their corresponding ground rule, and the density of the network of cross-interests that can be achieved as a result of the respective regional integration agreements, reflected in multiple transnational social and production networks.

The development of the eurozone. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 2, January 2013

From the Introduction. It is the year 1946 and the Second World War has just ended and not even thirty years had passed since the ‘war to end all wars’ ended, how ironic. Numerous countries in Europe suffered from both the loss of lives and the destruction of land. Powerful countries had been demolished and almost every country on European soil had been affected in some way or another. Change needed to happen for the European people, everyone knew it, and Winston Churchill voiced it. In his speech at Zurich University in 1946, Churchill brought up ideas that would forever change Europe.

The emblematic statement of the Nobel Peace Prize. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 1, January 2013

From the Introduction. On October 12th the Nobel Committee announced that the annual Nobel Peace Prize would be awarded to the European Union for, “promoting peace, democracy and human rights over six decades”.1 This was a bit of good news for the EU who had produced nothing but bad press with the Euro Crisis, the bailouts of struggling countries like Greece, and protests in the southern member states of Spain, Portugal, and Italy. At such a momentous occasion the EU’s next challenge was to figure out who would be the rightful head of the EU to accept the award. The EU has made their decision by opting to send its top three officials Jose Manuel Barroso the President of the European Commission, Herman Van Rompuy the President of the European Council, and Martin Schulz the President of the European Parliament2 as a sign that the EU is not headed by one person but instead is an supranational economic and political bloc that seeks to unify the European continent. Their symbolic acceptance of the award is in response to what Geir Lundestad, the Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, called, “an accumulated record.”3 This record has ushered the EU into the international spotlight as a beacon for countries in the EU’s periphery to want to join the bloc.

Research and teaching the European Union in Latin America. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special, December 2012

NOTE: there is an appendix to this document on the Archive at ei.pitt.edu/29784/ From the Introduction. The tasks of research, teaching and public opinion outreach activities on the European Union in the Latin American subcontinent2 are propelled by two principal motivations. In the first place, interest on the EU originates from the historical proximity between Europe and Latin America. There are no other two regions in the world with a deeper mutual affinity than the one existing between Europe and the conglomerate composed by Latin America and the Caribbean. Only the intimate relationship forged by the United States with the Europe continent is perhaps stronger, and even more special with the United Kingdom.

European Union-Latin American relations in a turbulant era. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, Special December 2012

From the Introduction. The mere mentioning of “the Trans-Atlantic Relationship” generates a standard interpretation. Customary understanding claims that it is supposed to deal with the links between Europe and the United States (moderately expanded to include Canada, a country taken for granted). This is a view shared both in Brussels and Washington. This geographical concept very rarely refers to include the role of Mexico, for example. This “relationship” is never understood as triangular, formed by three partners (United States/Canada, Europe and Latin America/Caribbean). A quadrangular format, including Africa, is contemplated only in a bilateral sense (usually when one of the important partners (the United States or Europe) is considered as a protagonist. In sum, “Atlantis” (as an entity shared by all) is as mysterious and difficult to grasp as the myth of antiquity, as a problem that this volume surely tries to grasp and analysis.

Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6

The European Union and the United States, before the election: a much deeper mutual understanding. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12 Special, October 2012

From the Introduction. Governor Romney’s statement that President Obama was trying to convert the United States into a European state actually served to point out the need for a much deeper understanding of both entities to make considerable progress in the future. The need for a close alliance is taken for granted. However, the link is riddled with confusion and stereotypes. This relationship is considered a normal fact forged by mutual historical legacies. Hence the frequent signs of awkward behaviour and misunderstandings under the cover of the notion that potential damage will be corrected by the force of the special relationship. If conflicts are detected, both parties are said to be condemned to agree. If a lack of knowledge is detected, it will be modified by accessible means. Mechanisms for an understanding and cooperation are within reach. Therefore, an effective relationship is not utopian. However, there are areas in which much work is needed to strengthen the alliance and correct its shortcomings. There is a need, not only for agreements in economic and political issues, but also for a deeper understanding of the essence of both entities.