53 resultados para Mural painting and decoration, German
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.
Resumo:
The crisis in Ukraine and the Russian intervention have brought about a situation in which it is necessary for Germany to make decisions and take action. No one in Berlin was prepared for this nor did anyone want this to occur. The effect of this is that the government has adopted a clearly critical stance on Russia, albeit in tandem with cautious diplomatic moves; it has given its consent to limited sanctions on representatives of the Russian elite, and has disapproved of economic sanctions. On the other hand, voices have been heard in the political debate in Germany not only warning of the catastrophic consequences of a deterioration in German-Russian relations but also those in fact expressing understanding for the Russian reaction. Although it is typical above all of the business circles engaged in Russia and the authors of Germany’s Ostpolitik to downplay the Kremlin’s moves, political parties and the German public are divided over how Germany should respond to Moscow’s policy, and this dispute will worsen. Berlin will take a whole array of actions to de-escalate the conflict, since the imposition of radical political and economic sanctions on Russia would also have a strong adverse effect on Germany. As regards sanctions, Germany would not only sustain economic losses, but they would also undermine the ideological foundations for the still popular vision for Germany’s strategy towards Russia in which great emphasis is laid on a strong “respect for the EU’s most important neighbour and its interests”.
Resumo:
In the post-war era, Germany has undergone a deep change almost like clockwork every two decades. In 1949, the foundations were laid for the establishment of the two German states: the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic; 1968–1969 was the time of the student revolt as a harbinger of the democratisation and liberalisation of society; and in 1989–1990, the process of unification took place, with all its consequences. Two decades later, another deep revision of the values is happening, as a consequence of which Germany is bidding a final farewell to the post-war epoch and its inherent certainties: its advancing society, the homogeneous national state and the faith in Europe as a solution to the ‘German question.’ This revision will not be revolutionary. However, as with the previous turning points, Germany is becoming a different state and a different society, which Europe will have to build its relations with anew.
Resumo:
Parliamentary debates about the resolution of the EU debt crisis seem to provide a good example for the frequently assumed “politicizationˮ of European governance. Against this background, the paper argues that in order to make sense of this assumption, a clearer differentiation of three thematic focal points of controversies – with regard to the assessment of government leadership, concerning the debate between competing party ideologies within the left/right dimension, and with regard to the assessment of supranational integration – is needed. Applying this threefold distinction, the paper uses a theory of differential Europeanization to explain differences in the thematic structure of debates in the Austrian Nationalrat, the British House of Commons, and the German Bundestag. Empirically, the paper is based on data gained from the computer-based coding of plenary debates about the resolution of the European debt crisis between 2010 and 2011.
Resumo:
At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).
A weak link? Germany in the Euro-Atlantic security system. OSW Point of View Number 47, January 2015
Resumo:
The political, military and economic parameters of German power influence the vision of the international order that Berlin favours. Politically, Germany is a regional power in the EU with considerable diplomatic potential. Economically, it is the world's third largest power with growing global trade and investment links. At the same time, Germany's military potential is limited and the German strategic culture makes the country sceptical about the use of military instruments. Berlin is thus essentially interested in maintaining peace and stability, both in Europe and globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to manage regional and global crises and conflicts. The German preference for dialogue and compromise in conflict situations in the regional and global dimensions may increasingly pose a risk to maintaining the cohesion and credibility of NATO – both from the perspective of the USA and Germany’s allies from Central-Eastern and Northern Europe.
Resumo:
The 7 March EU-Turkey migration crisis summit took place three days after the Turkish authorities seized Feza media group, which includes Turkey’s largest circulation daily Zaman and its English language sister paper Today’s Zaman. The seizure was the latest development in the worst crackdown on fundamental rights and freedoms Turkey has witnessed in decades. Yet because Turkey is vital in dealing with the migration/refugee crisis, the EU’s response was meek to say the least. For the first time since the Cold War – when Turkey was key in shoring up Europe’s security – Ankara has found itself in a particular position of strength. Turkey has skillfully exploited the EU’s and particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s urgent need to find a way out of the crisis.
Resumo:
The 7 March EU-Turkey migration crisis summit took place three days after the Turkish authorities seized Feza media group, which includes Turkey’s largest circulation daily Zaman and its English language sister paper Today’s Zaman. The seizure was the latest development in the worst crackdown on fundamental rights and freedoms Turkey has witnessed in decades. Yet because Turkey is vital in dealing with the migration/refugee crisis, the EU’s response was meek to say the least. For the first time since the Cold War – when Turkey was key in shoring up Europe’s security – Ankara has found itself in a particular position of strength. Turkey has skillfully exploited the EU’s and particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s urgent need to find a way out of the crisis.
Resumo:
[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3