Germany’s ‘refugee’ problem. The most important test for Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 182/11.09.2015 2015-09-11

The rapid increase in the number of immigrants from outside of the EU coming to Germany has become the paramount political issue. According to new estimates, the number of individuals expected arrive in Germany in 2015 and apply for asylum there is 800,000, which is nearly twice as many as estimated in earlier forecasts. Various administrative, financial and social problems related to the influx of migrants are becoming increasingly apparent. The problem of ‘refugees’ (in public debate, the terms ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘economic immigrants’ have not been clearly defined and have often been used interchangeably) has been culminating for over a year. Despite this, it was being disregarded by Angela Merkel’s government which was preoccupied with debates on how to rescue Greece. It was only daily reports of cases of refugee centres being set on fire that convinced Chancellor Merkel to speak and to make immigration problem a priority issue (Chefsache). Neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition parties have a consistent idea of how Germany should react to the growing number of refugees. In this matter, divisions run across parties. Various solutions have been proposed, from liberalisation of laws on the right to stay in Germany to combating illegal immigration more effectively, which would be possible if asylum granting procedures were accelerated. The proposed solutions have not been properly thought through, instead they are reactive measures inspired by the results of opinion polls. This is why their assumptions are often contradictory. The situation is similar regarding the actions proposed by Chancellor Merkel which involve faster procedures to expel individuals with no right to stay in Germany and a plan to convince other EU states to accept ‘refugees’. None of these ideas is new – they were already present in the German internal debate.

Europe’s most wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System. CEPS Paper Liberty and Security in Europe 55/21 March 2013

This paper assesses the uses and misuses in the application of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system in the European Union. It examines the main quantitative results of this extradition system achieved between 2005 and 2011 on the basis of the existing statistical knowledge on its implementation at EU official levels. The EAW has been anchored in a high level of ‘mutual trust’ between the participating states’ criminal justice regimes and authorities. This reciprocal confidence, however, has been subject to an increasing number of challenges resulting from its practical application, presenting a dual conundrum: 1. Principle of proportionality: Who are the competent judicial authorities cooperating with each other and ensuring that there are sufficient impartial controls over the necessity and proportionality of the decisions on the issuing and execution of EAWs? 2. Principle of division of powers: How can criminal justice authorities be expected to handle different criminal judicial traditions in what is supposed to constitute a ‘serious’ or ‘minor’ crime in their respective legal settings and ‘who’ is ultimately to determine (divorced from political considerations) when is it duly justified to make the EAW system operational? It is argued that the next generation of the EU’s criminal justice cooperation and the EAW need to recognise and acknowledge that the mutual trust premise upon which the European system has been built so far is no longer viable without devising new EU policy stakeholders’ structures and evaluation mechanisms. These should allow for the recalibration of mutual trust and mistrust in EU justice systems in light of the experiences of the criminal justice actors and practitioners having a stake in putting the EAW into daily effect. Such a ‘bottom-up approach’ should be backed up with the best impartial and objective evaluation, an improved system of statistical collection and an independent qualitative assessment of its implementation. This should be placed as the central axis of a renewed EAW framework which should seek to better ensure the accountability, impartial (EU-led) scrutiny and transparency of member states’ application of the EAW in light of the general principles and fundamental rights constituting the foundations of the European system of criminal justice cooperation.

Sitting on the fence: Swedish defence policy and the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 33, April 2013

Sweden finds itself in the midst of the most heated debates about defence policy and the direction of military reforms since the end of the Cold War, as Stockholm faces the challenge of finding a new military security formula. From the Swedish point of view, the post-Cold War strategic timeout in Europe is coming to an end. The international environment is reverting to a situation in which the use of force among states is no longer an improbable scenario. Stockholm cannot rule out the emergence of crises or conflicts in Northern Europe in the future, which could directly or indirectly affect Sweden. In this context, the transformations of Sweden’s defence policy over the past twenty years have become a problem. Sweden has moved from neutrality, i.e. non-involvement on any side of an armed interstate conflict, to non-alignment, whereby it stays outside military alliances and freely shapes its policies during wartime. It has joined the European Union and co-operates closely with NATO on foreign missions. Its ability to defend its own territory, however, has diminished.

Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine's internal diversity. OSW Point of View Number 40, March 2014

Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country’s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ‘sub-Ukraines’ has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country’s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine – separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula.

In a state of necessity. How has Orban changed Hungary. OSW Point of View Number 41, April 2014

Viktor Orban’s sweeping victory in the 2010 election ensured his party, Fidesz, a constitutional two-thirds majority in parliament. The party took over the rule of the country from the discredited political left when Hungary was plunged in political and economic crisis. Claiming that the circumstances were unusual and that it had a strong electoral mandate, Fidesz introduced radical changes in the country and thus challenged the previous economic and political order. These changes have led to an unprecedented concentration of power and provoked a discussion on the limits of democracy and the rule of law in the European Union. The state’s economic role has strengthened. The Orban government has been unable to overcome economic stagnation but it has managed to stabilise Hungary’s budget situation, which needs to deal with the high debt. Hungary’s relations with most partners in the EU and NATO have cooled due to controversial moves made by its government. As regards foreign policy and economic co-operation, Orban has granted high priority to the ‘Eastern opening’, where Russia has assumed the leading role.

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.

The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 44, November 2014

The ‘turn to the East’ proclaimed by Russia in 2010 has failed to bring about a fundamental breakthrough in her relations with Asian countries, nor has it produced impulses for the economic modernization of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Although the energisation of Russian policy towards Asia which has taken place under this slogan has diversified Russian foreign policy somewhat, this diversification has two weak points: Firstly, it has occurred only in the political sphere. The share of Asian countries in Russia’s foreign economic relations has not risen significantly in comparison with the share of European and North American countries. Secondly, the ‘turn to the East’ has turned out primarily to be a turn towards China. In all spheres – diplomatic, economic, energy and military – it is Beijing that has become the most important Asian partner for Moscow. The result is that the policy that aimed to limit the excessive – in the Kremlin’s view – dependence of Russia on the West is likely to turn Russia into a ‘junior partner’ of the People’s Republic of China.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

The Middle East in the shadow of the Islamic State. OSW Point of View Number 52, August 2015

Since June 2014, Islamic State (IS) has been regarded as the principal security threat in the Middle East and one of the most important problems for European and global security. Islamic State, which for many years was just one of many terror organisations with links to al-Qaeda, has succeeded in achieving much more than other similar organisations: it has taken over control of large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq by military means, created its own para-state structures in that area, and become the greatest civilisational challenge for the region in a century as it established a self-proclaimed caliphate and credibly pledged to expand further on a global scale. Those successes have been accompanied by widely publicised acts of systemic brutality which meets the definition of crimes against humanity. One outcome of these developments is the emergence of an exotic informal alliance to combatthe Islamic State, which has brought together all the states from the Middle East and many from beyond the region. However, contrary to what could have been predicted, after almost a year of the declared war against IS, the Caliphate still holds most of the ground it gained in 2014.

Ukraine’s wartime nationalism. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 179, 28.08.2015

From the Introduction. The Euromaidan revolution and the war in Donbas that followed it have brought about deep changes in the way Ukrainian citizens think and have led to a rapid transformation of how people view the concept of national community. It began to be increasingly common for proponents of nationalism to refer to solidarity with the state instead of referring to the nation understood as an ethnic community, as they had previously done. This is due to the fact that an entire young generation has matured which takes the Ukrainian state for granted, but also because in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict most Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine have opted for Ukraine.

The migration of Ukrainians in times of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY Number 187, 2015-10-19

Before the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the scale of labour outward migration of Ukrainians had been characterised by a slight downward trend. Back in 2014, an increase in the number of Ukrainians who migrated to Russia was observed, although no similar increase was recorded for EU countries (excluding Poland). The year 2015 brought a more rapid surge in the number of Ukrainians migrating to the EU, again mainly to Poland. Due to the lack of current EU-wide data, estimates can be made based only on data compiled by national statistical offices in countries which are the most popular with Ukrainian migrants. In Poland, as of October 2015 Ukrainians held 52,000 valid residence cards. Much greater migration dynamics have been observed in the case of temporary migration – the number of declarations which enable an individual to take up a temporary job in Poland, issued in the first half of 2015, was a staggering 400,000. This means a more than twofold increase – in the whole of 2014 372,000 declarations were issued to Ukrainian citizens. No similar increase has so far been observed in other EU states, including Italy and the Czech Republic, which have always been popular destinations for Ukrainian migration. In late 2014, 233,000 Ukrainian migrants were registered in Italy (in late 2013 the figure was 191,000), whereas in the Czech Republic the number of Ukrainian migrants remains stable – 104,000 in June 2015.

China’s foreign direct investments within the ‘16+1’ cooperation formula: strategy, institutions, results. OSW Commentary Number 191|27.11.2015

The ‘16+1’ formula of cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and China was launched in 2012. One of its priorities involved increasing the inflow of China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) to the region. China has been interested in carrying out investments which are likely to help Chinese companies gain competitive advantage in areas such as advanced technologies, recognizable brands and distribution channels. The following sectors were identified as areas of priority importance in CEE: construction and modernisation of transport infrastructure, including motorways; development of the network of railways, airports and sea ports; energy, in particular renewable sources of energy and nuclear energy; companies trading in commodities; the food production sector. China’s strategy mainly involves purchasing existing companies, preceded by cherry picking the most favourable candidates for investment, rather than making large greenfield investments.