5 resultados para Model Based Development
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
This paper presents a theoretical model for the analysis of decisions regarding farm household labour allocation. The agricultural household model is selected as the most appropriate theoretical framework; a model based on the assumption that households behave to maximise utility, which is a function of consumption and leisure, and is subject to time and budget constraints. The model can be used to describe the role of government subsidies in farm household labour allocation decisions; in particular the impact of decoupled subsidies on labour allocation can be examined. Decoupled subsidies are a labour-free payment and as such represent an increase in labour-free income or wealth. An increase in wealth allows farm households to work less while maintaining consumption. On the other hand, decoupled subsidies represent a decline in the return to farm labour and may lead to a substitution effect, i.e., farmers may choose to substitute non-farm work for farm work. The theoretical framework proposed in this paper allows for the examination of these two conflicting effects.
Resumo:
The aim of this technical report is to quantify alternative energy demand and supply scenarios for ten southern and eastern Mediterranean countries up to 2030. The report presents the model-based results of four alternative scenarios that are broadly in line with the MEDPRO scenario specifications on regional integration and cooperation with the EU. The report analyses the main implications of the scenarios in the following areas: • final energy demand by sector (industry, households, services, agriculture and transport); • the evolution of the power generation mix, the development of renewable energy sources and electricity exports to the EU; • primary energy production and the balance of trade for hydrocarbons; • energy-related CO2 emissions; and • power generation costs.
Resumo:
The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.
Resumo:
Prior research on citizen support for European integration does not consider how individuals’ evaluations of European nationalities are associated with support. This paper fills this gap by developing a political cohesion model based on social identity theory. I claim that the probability of supporting integration increases with greater levels of trust in fellow Europeans, which assumes to reflect their positive images. Also, trust in eastern European Union nationalities has the highest impact on the probability for support, followed by trust in the southern nationalities, and then northern nationalities due to the eastern and southern nationalities relatively lower economic development. Controlling for various factors, the ordered logistic regression analysis of the European Election Study (2004) data support these claims.
Resumo:
Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.