Analyser l’influence du syndicalisme agricole majoritaire: quelle utilité pour le modèle néo-corporatiste? Etude de cas à partir du «mini-paquet lait» = Analyze the influence of the majority agricultural trade unionism: what use to the neo-corporatist model? Case study from the "mini-milk package". Bruges Political Research Paper No. 35, August 2014

Cette recherche se propose de réfléchir sur la place des groupes d’intérêts dans le système politique de l’UE en partant de l’exemple de la filière lait. Dans un système généralement pluraliste, la PAC fait en effet figure de cas particulier puisqu’elle a fonctionné à partir des années 1960 sur une logique de co-gestion de la politique des marchés entre la Commission et la principale fédération agricole européenne, le Comité des Organisations Professionnelles agricoles (COPA) associé depuis 1962 au Comité Général de la Coopération agricole de l'Union européenne (COGECA). Néanmoins, du fait du processus de réforme de la PAC engagé depuis 1992, il paraît nécessaire d’analyser si la logique de co-gestion est remise en cause. Cette recherche conclue qu’il existe bien un rapport néo-corporatiste dans le secteur laitier, dans le sens où un acteur en particulier, le syndicat COPA-COGECA est parvenu à influencer de manière déterminante la procédure en obtenant de renforcer le pouvoir de négociation des producteurs sans revenir sur les réformes récentes de la PAC.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.