The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2008

On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the military instrument was intended to generate the desired political effects. The paper argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of humanitarian deterrence: the threat of military force is used to discourage potential spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the political ambitions would have suggested.

Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces. OSW Point of View Number 28, May 2012

This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.

EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in troubled waters. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2015

Apprehending pirates in the Indian Ocean is one thing. Defeating the networks through which smugglers traffic migrants through North Africa is quite another. The European Union’s new naval force deployment in the Mediterranean - EUNAVFOR MED - drew criticism from international partners and the general public alike when plans for a “boat-sinking” operation were unveiled, raising fears about unacceptable levels of violence and collateral damage; a European version of Mexico’s drug war. Yet the problems of EUNAVFOR MED lie less in clumsy public diplomacy than in the perilous mismatch between its stated objectives and the absence of a clear strategy and mandate, and this creates both operational and political risks for member states. Phase 1 of the operation: surveillance and assessment, has begun with no legal mandate to carry out the crucial phases 2 and 3: seek and destroy, whose military planning and outcomes are undetermined. Despite these limitations, the naval force could nevertheless mark a turning point in the EU’s security narrative, because it means that the Union is finally addressing the threats to security and the humanitarian tragedies in its southern neighbourhood.

The European Union’s Response to Piracy: Are the Lessons Learned in the Horn of Africa a Model for the Gulf of Guinea? EU Diplomacy Paper/2015

The European Union (EU) is seen as the leading actor in successfully fighting piracy around the Horn of Africa. As a global trade power with strong economic interests, the EU is also challenged by similar maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis to assess the potential transfer of successful EU instruments from the Horn of Africa to the piracy situation in West African waters. This paper examines to what extent the EU can draw on its experience made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West African waters. Based on qualitative research interviews, lessons learned from East Africa are identified and subsequently applied to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The results show that the EU is only partially drawing on its experience made in the Horn of Africa. One the one hand, it is rather reluctant to use crisis management instruments such as naval operations. On the other hand, the EU is drawing on its successful leadership in international political and military cooperation from around the Horn of Africa in order to make more effective use of available resources in the Gulf of Guinea.