The Shaping of EU-Mercosur Relations: From Altruism to Pragmatism and Liberalism to Illiberalism. Pittsburgh Papers on the European Union Vol. 1, (2012)

Deeply-embedded norms of liberalism and protectionism alongside EU policies focusing on promoting development and regional integration have shaped EU-Mercosur relations. These stand in stark contrast to the policies of the US, the historic hegemon in the region. This paper utilizes historical institutionalism to understand how the liberal tenets of EU competition policy and the protectionism of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have affected EU-Mercosur relations. Particular foci include Spain’s role in spearheading efforts to promote EU-Latin American relations and the way EU competition policies directed against monopolies in Europe spurred increased investment in Latin America, especially the Southern Cone. The latter prompted the EU to forge closer ties with Mercosur, encouraged cooperation and development programs and spurred regional integration and liberal trade regimes in Latin America.

The French Constitutional Council as the Rottweiler of the Republican Ideal in the Language Field: Does Jurisprudence Really Reflect Reality? EDAP 03/2012, 2012

France is known for being a champion of individual rights as well as for its overt hostility to any form of group rights. Linguistic pluralism in the public sphere is rejected for fear of babelization and Balkanization of the country. Over recent decades the Conseil Constitutionnel (CC) has, together with the Conseil d’État, remained arguably the strongest defender of this Jacobin ideal in France. In this article, I will discuss the role of France’s restrictive language policy through the prism of the CC’s jurisprudence. Overall, I will argue that the CC made reference to the (Jacobin) state-nation concept, a concept that is discussed in the first part of the paper, in order to fight the revival of regional languages in France over recent decades. The clause making French the official language in 1992 was functional to this policy. The intriguing aspect is that in France the CC managed to standardise France’s policy vis-à-vis regional and minority languages through its jurisprudence; an issue discussed in the second part of the paper. But in those regions with a stronger tradition of identity, particularly in the French overseas territories, the third part of the paper argues, normative reality has increasingly become under pressure. Therefore, a discrepancy between the ‘law in courts’ and the compliance with these decisions (‘law in action’) has been emerging over recent years. Amid some signs of opening of France to minorities, this contradiction delineates a trend that might well continue in future.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

Creating Stability: National Preferences and the Origins of European Monetary System. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.9, December 2000

This essay compares the preferences of France, Italy, and Britain on the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979, especially the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which stabilised nominal exchange rates. My claim is that the different conclusions reached by the governments (France and Italy in, Britain out) cannot be explained by economic circumstances or by interests, and I elaborate an intervening institutional variable which helps explain preferences. Deducing from spatial theory that where decisionmakers `sit' on the left-right spectrum matters to their position on the EMS, I argue that domestic constitutional power-. sharing mechanisms privilege certain actors over others in a predictable and consistent way. Where centrists were in power, the government's decision was to join. Where left or right extremists were privileged, the government's decision was negative. The article measures the centrism of the governments in place at the time, and also reviews the positions taken by the national political parties in and out of government. It is intended to contribute to the growing comparativist literature on the European Union, and to the burgeoning literature on EU-member-state relations.