Trading off sovereignty. The outcome of Belarus's integration with Russia in the security and defence field. OSW Commentary No. 107, 2013-04-25

Although the Republic of Belarus is constitutionally designated as a neutral country1, it is in fact closely connected with Russia’s own security and defence architecture. Within the Union State of Belarus and Russia, the armed forces are integrated to an extent unequalled in the world. A legacy of the Soviet division of labour, the Belarusian defence industry complex remains structurally dependent on Russia, which is its main raw material provider, outlet for exports and intermediary on world markets. Bilateral military cooperation also builds on the perception of common threats and partly shared security interests. Hence it unfolds regardless of the disputes that sporadically sour relations between Minsk and Moscow, standing out as the main achievement of the Union State – if not the only one.

The European Union-an expanding security community? EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2012, August 2012

This paper investigates why and how the geographical scope of the security community centered around the European Union (EU) is expanding. It starts from the assumption that the EU itself is a ‘tightly-coupled mature pluralistic security community’. The analysis of the expansion of this peaceful area is based on the theoretical framework first designed by Karl Deutsch and later developed by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. Contrary to the logic of the adage ‘si vis pacem para bellum’, I argue that the security community is expanding because the EU’s own origins and self-perception are driven by an ambition to create lasting peace. The key mechanisms I explore are the EU’s enlargement and neighborhood policies, which are best understood when analyzed against the concept of concentric circles: the regional EU-centered security community is a multi-speed security community, stronger at its core and weaker as it spreads towards its margins.

The EU’s re-engagement as a security actor: Fresh start or still sleepwalking. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2012

By the end of the summer, the EU will launch new crisis management missions in the Horn of Africa, Niger and South Sudan. In this CEPS Commentary, Giovanni Faleg and Steven Blockmans question whether the new deployments will revive the EU’s persona as a global security actor. The authors point out that, without the backing of a comprehensive security strategy rationale, the EU’s re-engagement as a crisis manager that opts for small-scale operations will be seen as a continuation of its sleepwalking through a changing geostrategic landscape.

Two Boats in the Mediterranean and their Unfortunate Encounters with Europe’s Policies towards People on the Move. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 48, 20 July 2012

Two stark reminders of the difficulties that people on the move encounter in the Mediterranean have been grabbing headlines recently: the so-called ‘left-to-die’ boat report and the ground-breaking Hirsi judgment. These two instances present the worst of both worlds: the first concerns a migrant boat that was ignored altogether, resulting in many deaths, whereas the second concerns a migrant boat being intercepted but subsequently dealt with in a way that contradicts Europe’s human rights standards. These two cases are neither isolated nor incidental. Instead they are of wider concern to the EU and reminders of structural deficiencies in Europe’s approach to people on the move in the Mediterranean. This paper identifies those cross-cutting deficiencies and proposes recommendations to correct them.