Farm/Household-Level Simulation: Results of Testing Policy and Other Scenarios. Factor Markets Working Document No. 54, June 2013

Among the different production factors, land is the one that most often limits farm development and one of the most studied. The connection between policy and other context variables and land markets is at the core of the policy debate, including the present reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The proposal of the latter has been published in October 2011 and in Italy it will include the switch of the payment regime from an historical to a regional basis. The authors’ objective is to simulate the impact of the proposed policy reform on the land market, particularly on land values and propensity to transaction. They combine insights and data from a farm household investment model revised and extended in order to simulate the demand curve for land in different policy scenarios and a survey of farmers stated intention carried out in the province of Bologna (Italy) in 2012. Based on these results, the authors calibrate a mathematical programming model of land market exchanges for the province of Bologna and use this model form simulation. The results of the model largely corroborate the results from the survey and both hint at a relevant reaction of the land demand and supply to the shift from the historical to the regionalised payments. As effect, the regionalisation would result in increased rental prices and in a tendency to the re-allocation of land.

Creating Stability: National Preferences and the Origins of European Monetary System. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.9, December 2000

This essay compares the preferences of France, Italy, and Britain on the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979, especially the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which stabilised nominal exchange rates. My claim is that the different conclusions reached by the governments (France and Italy in, Britain out) cannot be explained by economic circumstances or by interests, and I elaborate an intervening institutional variable which helps explain preferences. Deducing from spatial theory that where decisionmakers `sit' on the left-right spectrum matters to their position on the EMS, I argue that domestic constitutional power-. sharing mechanisms privilege certain actors over others in a predictable and consistent way. Where centrists were in power, the government's decision was to join. Where left or right extremists were privileged, the government's decision was negative. The article measures the centrism of the governments in place at the time, and also reviews the positions taken by the national political parties in and out of government. It is intended to contribute to the growing comparativist literature on the European Union, and to the burgeoning literature on EU-member-state relations.