Germany’s ‘refugee’ problem. The most important test for Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 182/11.09.2015 2015-09-11

The rapid increase in the number of immigrants from outside of the EU coming to Germany has become the paramount political issue. According to new estimates, the number of individuals expected arrive in Germany in 2015 and apply for asylum there is 800,000, which is nearly twice as many as estimated in earlier forecasts. Various administrative, financial and social problems related to the influx of migrants are becoming increasingly apparent. The problem of ‘refugees’ (in public debate, the terms ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘economic immigrants’ have not been clearly defined and have often been used interchangeably) has been culminating for over a year. Despite this, it was being disregarded by Angela Merkel’s government which was preoccupied with debates on how to rescue Greece. It was only daily reports of cases of refugee centres being set on fire that convinced Chancellor Merkel to speak and to make immigration problem a priority issue (Chefsache). Neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition parties have a consistent idea of how Germany should react to the growing number of refugees. In this matter, divisions run across parties. Various solutions have been proposed, from liberalisation of laws on the right to stay in Germany to combating illegal immigration more effectively, which would be possible if asylum granting procedures were accelerated. The proposed solutions have not been properly thought through, instead they are reactive measures inspired by the results of opinion polls. This is why their assumptions are often contradictory. The situation is similar regarding the actions proposed by Chancellor Merkel which involve faster procedures to expel individuals with no right to stay in Germany and a plan to convince other EU states to accept ‘refugees’. None of these ideas is new – they were already present in the German internal debate.

La disoccupazione giovanile in tempo di crisi: un monito all’Europa (continentale) per rifondare il diritto del lavoro? = Youth Unemployment in Recessionary Times: a Caveat to (Continental) Europe to Reconstruct its Labour Law. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 91/2012

The current debate taking place in continental Europe on the need to reform labour law to reduce the duality between labour market insiders and outsiders, thus giving new employment opportunities to young people seems to be, at its best, a consequence of the crisis, or at its worst, an excuse. The considerable emphasis placed on the power of legislation to reduce youth unemployment prevents real labour market problems from being clearly identified, thus reducing the scope to adopt more effective measures. Action is certainly required to help young people during the current crisis, yet interventions should not be exclusively directed towards increased flexibility and deregulation. This paper questions the “thaumaturgic power” wrongly attributed to legislative interventions and put forward a more holistic approach to solve the problem of youth employment, by focusing on the education systems, school-to-work transition and industrial relations. As a comparative analysis demonstrates, in order to effectively tackle the issue of youth employment, it is not enough to reform labour law. High quality education systems, apprenticeship schemes, efficient placement and employment services, cooperative industrial relations and flexible wage determination mechanisms are the key to success when it comes to youth employment, not only in times of recession.

Collateral and Credit Rationing. The role of collateral in explaining and remediating the limited flow of credit to households and SMEs. ECRI Policy Brief No. 7, February 2014

European-wide data concerning both companies and households indicate that the credit rationing phenomenon, which has been predicted by theory, does in fact occur to a significant degree in the European credit market. Among SMEs, micro companies are most vulnerable and the current economic crisis has only made these concerns more pressing. Top-down use of the monetary transmission mechanism alone is insufficient to counter the problem. The other solution consists of a bottom-up, microeconomic stimulation of lending transactions, by focusing on collateral and guarantees. The data confirm the high importance that lenders – especially individual households and micro companies – attach to collateral and guarantees when making their lending decisions. As a consequence, we would argue that those parts of the law governing security interests and guarantees should be one of the primary targets for government policy aimed at improving credit flows, especially in avoiding a conflict between consumer protection measures and laws on surety and guarantees. This policy brief firstly aims to give an overview of the problem of credit rationing and to show that low-income households and SMEs are most concerned by the phenomenon. Focusing solely on loans as a way of financing and on the issues related to access to finance by micro and small companies as well households, it then sketches possible solutions focused on guarantees. This paper brings together data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption survey (HFCS), Eurostat, and both the latest wave of the extended biennial EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance of SMEs (EC/ECB SAFE 2013) and the latest wave of the smaller semi-annual ECB SAFE Survey, covering the period between October 2012 and March 2013.

The effort to stabilise the financial system in Japan: an outline and the characteristics of the programme for financial revival. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/02, 18 March 2015

This Working Paper provides an overview of the Programme for Financial Revival announced in October 2002 in Japan. The programme aimed to dramatically reduce the large amount of non-performing loans that remained until the end of the 1990s. In addition to solving the problem of bad loans, the Programme for Financial Revival aimed to build a strong financial system. For this purpose, the programme comprised three pillars: 1) creation of a new framework for the financial system, 2) creation of a new framework for corporate revitalisation, 3) creation of a new framework for financial administration. The Japanese experience suggests that despite its delayed introduction, this programme may be considered successful in going some way to drastically reduce non-performing loans and stabilise the financial system. Japan’s financial problems and their resolution since the 1990s provide a number of lessons for other economies, particularly for Europe in relation to the difficulties over the euro.