Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decision-making in the EU. IHS Political Science Series No. 132, February 2013

The EU has tried to bridge decision making by qualified majority and unanimity over the years by expanding qualified majorities (consensus) or by making unanimities easier to achieve. I call this decision-making procedure q-“unanimity” and trace its history from the Luxembourg compromise to the Lisbon Treaty, and to more recent agreements. I analyze the most recent and explicit mechanism of this bridging (article 31 (2) of the Lisbon Treaty) and identify one specific means by which the transformation of qualified majorities to unanimities is achieved: the reduction of precision or scope of the decision, so that different behaviors can be covered by it. I provide empirical evidence of such a mechanism by analyzing legislative decisions. Finally, I argue that this bridging is a ubiquitous feature of EU institutions, used in Treaties as well as in legislative decision-making.

The new European Parliament: Workable but impaired? CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2014

The ongoing selection of the next President of the European Commission has underscored the growing importance of the European Parliament in EU decisionmaking and in promoting democratic legitimacy at EU level. Strikingly, the new Parliament will be more Eurosceptical, radical and fragmented than ever before, which, among other things, will constrain the building of majorities to pass legislation and adopt decisions. The close relationship between the outcome of the EP elections and the governability of the EP should prompt a serious debate on the matter.