The EU-Turkey Customs Union: A model for Future Euro-Med Integration. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 9/March 2012

This paper studying the 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union (CU) reveals that the CU has been a major instrument of integration of the Turkish economy into the EU and global markets, offering powerful tools to reform the Turkish economy. Turkish producers of industrial goods are protected by tariffs from external competition to exactly the same extent as EU producers, and they face competition from duty-free imports of industrial goods from world-class pan-European firms. In return, Turkish industrial producers have duty-free market access to the European Economic Area, which was recently extended to certain Mediterranean countries. Trade liberalisation achieved through the CU has thus successfully moved the Turkish economy from a government-controlled regime to a market-based one, and Turkish producers of industrial goods have performed remarkably well. The paper further shows that market access conditions for Turkish producers are determined, in addition to tariffs, by standards, conformity assessment procedures, competition policy, industrial property rights and contingent protectionism measures. The CU also offered Turkey the opportunity to establish new institutions, and modernise and upgrade rules and disciplines required for the elimination of technical barriers to trade, and for the implementation of the EU’s competition, industrial property rights, and contingent protectionism policies.

EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in troubled waters. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2015

Apprehending pirates in the Indian Ocean is one thing. Defeating the networks through which smugglers traffic migrants through North Africa is quite another. The European Union’s new naval force deployment in the Mediterranean - EUNAVFOR MED - drew criticism from international partners and the general public alike when plans for a “boat-sinking” operation were unveiled, raising fears about unacceptable levels of violence and collateral damage; a European version of Mexico’s drug war. Yet the problems of EUNAVFOR MED lie less in clumsy public diplomacy than in the perilous mismatch between its stated objectives and the absence of a clear strategy and mandate, and this creates both operational and political risks for member states. Phase 1 of the operation: surveillance and assessment, has begun with no legal mandate to carry out the crucial phases 2 and 3: seek and destroy, whose military planning and outcomes are undetermined. Despite these limitations, the naval force could nevertheless mark a turning point in the EU’s security narrative, because it means that the Union is finally addressing the threats to security and the humanitarian tragedies in its southern neighbourhood.