Low key but not low impact: the results of the EU's 'transition' summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 27 October 2014

The European Council Summit of 23-24 October 2014 may have been relatively low key, but many important decisions were made which could encourage historical changes. In this post-summit analysis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis examines the agreement reached on a new climate and energy policy framework for 2020-2030 which despite falling short of the European Commission’s original proposals, it nevertheless delivers a positive message to international community ahead of the global climate negotiations next year. He also highlights the significance of the request from euro-zone leaders for a new report on ‘better economic governance’ by December. More broadly, he uses this moment of transition in the EU’s leadership to analyse the current state and future direction of the Union, and underlines the need to provide a coherent and holistic response to the damage caused by the crisis and the challenges facing the Union, on the basis of an ambitious but pragmatic ‘package deal’ – a new pact between EU governments, and between the Union and its citizens – to heal the divisions of recent years and restore public faith in the benefits of EU membership.

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.

The Impact of Spain’s Economic and Political Crisis on the European Elections. EPIN Commentaries No. 17, 2 April 2014

Despite the emergence of a critical debate against the EU-imposed austerity measures both at the level of the political elites and on the street, this EPIN Commentary by two Spanish political scientists based in Barcelona finds no sign that the upcoming European elections will have a more European focus than any of the previous ones. While there is no anti-European discourse among the Spanish mainstream political parties, they report that public trust in the European institutions is plummeting and Spanish turnout in European elections has been dropping in the last few years. In the authors’ view, the main reason for this is the low level of awareness of the functioning of the European Parliament but some responsibility also lies with the Spanish political parties and the way they deal with the electoral campaign to mobilise the discontented voters, who consider unemployment and the economic situation as the two most important issues that the country is facing at the moment.

Synthesis Report on the Impact of Capital Use. Factor Markets Working Document No. 57, August 2013

This paper examines the drivers of productivity in EU agriculture from a factor markets perspective. Using econometrically estimated production elasticities and shadow prices of factors for a set of eight EU member states, we focus on field crop farms represented in the FADN database for the years 2002-08. As it turned out that output reacts most elastically to materials input, we investigate this factor further and find different rationing regimes represented in different member states. Marginal return on materials is low in Denmark and West Germany, but significantly above typical market interest rates in East Germany, Italy and Spain. In the latter countries and in Denmark it also increased towards the end of the observed period. This finding is consistent with a perception of tightening funding access, possibly induced or reinforced by the unfolding financial crisis. Marginal returns to land, labour and fixed capital are generally low. We conclude that the functioning of factor markets plays a crucial role for productivity growth, but that factor market operations display considerable heterogeneity across EU member states.

Students in Work and their Impact on the Labour Market. CEPS Working Document No. 410/July 2015

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the size and composition of the student labour force in order to consider its potential impact on labour markets in the European Union. The paper is based on an analysis of EU Labour Force Survey data from 2011, supplemented by the findings of the EUROSTUDENT project. The structure of student labour is discussed within the framework of the so-called ‘crowding-out’ literature, which identifies competition for jobs between students and low educated non-students, particularly in the retail and wholesale sectors. In contrast to these assumptions, the authors found that, depending on the age of the student, the profile of student workers closely matches that of non-students with medium- to-high educational attainment. In general, the retail and wholesale sectors are of importance in the employment of students under the age of 25, but students typically take positions in the middle of the occupational hierarchy, rather than in the lower-grade positions. Meanwhile, older students, often professionals furthering their education while studying, are typically located in similar jobs and sectors to university graduates. A common trait of student work is its very high degree of flexibility compared to that of non-students. Nevertheless, the structure of student labour does not lead us to believe that student workers are particularly prone to be present in the precarious segment of the labour market.