Social Content of the International Sphere: Symbols and Meaning in Franco-German Relations, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.2, 2002

“The Franco-German friendship is rich in memories and gestures that are at once important and symbolic, and that characterize the exceptional nature of the relationship between our two countries,” reflects former French economics minister and European Commission President Jacques Delors. Such symbolic acts and joint memories are not primarily about cooperation in specific instances. Rather, more generally, they denote what it means to act together. They lend significance to a relationship; they signify what is “at stake,” or what it is “all about.” They are about a deeper and more general social purpose underlying specific instances of cooperation. They are about the value and intrinsic importance that social relations incorporate. Symbols contribute to the institutionalization of social meaning and social purpose in dealing with one another. In this paper I clarify the concept of “predominantly symbolic acts and practices among states,” systematically explore such acts for the bilateral Franco-German relationship between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s, and scrutinize the specific meaning and effects that these practices have helped to generate and perpetuate.

EU Budgetary Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’: Reconfiguring the Funding Landscape. CEPS Paper Liberty and Security in Europe No. 93/May 2016

This paper analyses the EU budgetary responses to the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. The European Commission has proposed several changes to the EU budget as well as the establishment of new funding instruments. The paper explores what the announced funding consists of, what role it plays in policy-making and what issues it generates. Throughout these budgetary responses the search for flexibility has been dominant, motivated by the need to respond more swiftly to humanitarian and operational needs. In addition, the paper argues that beyond implementation or management, the role of funding is also symbolic and communicative. In light of limited competences that are difficult to exercise, funding represents a powerful tool enabling the Commission to shape policy-making in times of crisis. At the same time, the dominant search for flexibility also challenges established funding rules and procedures. It has furthermore led to reduced space for democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament. More profoundly, EU funding for cooperation with third countries to prevent the inflow of refugees and asylum seekers has monetised questions over the responsibility for these individuals. As the EU–Turkey agreement shows, this has created a self-imposed dependence on third countries, with the risk of potentially insatiable demands for EU funding. This paper questions the proportionality and rule of law compliance of allocating funding for the implementation of this agreement. Moreover, it proposes that the Commission take steps to practically safeguard the humanitarian aid principles in the management structures of the new funding instruments, and it stresses the need for more scrutiny of the reconfigured funding landscape by the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors.

The Convention on the Future of Europe: Extended Working Group or Constitutional Assembly? Research Papers in Law, 4/2005

From the Introduction. “We are a Convention. We are not an Intergovernmental Conference because we have not been given a mandate by Governments to negotiate on their behalf the solutions which we propose. We are not a Parliament because we are not elected by citizens to draft legislative texts. […] We are a Convention. What does this mean? A Convention is a group of men and women meeting for the sole purpose of preparing a joint proposal. […] It is a task modest in form but immense in content, for if it succeeds in accordance with our mandate, it will light up the future of Europe”.1 In his speech inaugurating the Convention process on 26 February 2002 in Brussels, Convention President VALÉRY GISCARD D’ESTAING raises three issues: first, he refers to the Convention’s nature and method; second, he talks of the Convention’s aim and output; and, third, he evokes the Convention’s historic and symbolic significance. All three aspects have been amply discussed in the past two years by politicians and academics analysing whether the Convention’s purpose and instruments differ fundamentally from those of previous reform rounds; whether the input into and output of the Convention process qualitatively improves European Treaty revision; and whether the Convention as an institution lived up to its symbolic and normative load, reflected in comparisons with “Philadelphia” or references to a “constitutional moment”.2