Unemployment is the scourge, not youth unemployment per se. The misguided policy preoccupation with youth. CEPS Policy Brief No. 294, 26 June 2013

This Policy Brief argues that too much effort and political capital is being spent by the Commission and member states on being seen to be doing something quickly about youth unemployment when, in fact, the structural measures proposed will only have long-term effects. Expectations of immediate relief are running well above what can be delivered, especially at the EU level. Given the macroeconomic situation, no policy option will deliver a significant dent in either youth unemployment or unemployment in general. The EU policies on the table that are supposed to have an immediate effect, such as increased lending from the European Investment Bank to SMEs for the hiring of young people, will only have a very marginal impact on youth unemployment. Moreover, this impact will come mostly to the detriment of older unemployed persons excluded from such a scheme. Given the perceived need to ‘be seen to be doing something’, we fear that policies subsidising young workers de facto at the expense of older workers or, even worse, policies that subsidise older workers for not taking young people’s jobs, will proliferate. In fact, it is not at all clear that young people suffer more from being unemployed than older people, or even disproportionately more than older unemployed individuals. In particular, it is not clear that the much-publicised notion of a ‘lost generation’ with permanent ‘scars’ is relevant only to the young generation. The paper ends by highlighting the much-neglected policy option of encouraging labour mobility within the internal market. Although the Commission is ‘upgrading and modernising’ its tools, much more could be done in this area – to the benefit of the individuals concerned, the member states, and European integration in general.

One year after the Youth Guarantee: Policy fatigue or signs of action? EPC Policy Brief, 27 May 2015

In April 2013, the EU Council called on EU member states to establish Youth Guarantee (YG) schemes, ensuring that “all young people under the age of 25 years receive a good-quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeship or traineeship within a period of four months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education”. Implementation was meant to start more than a year ago, but political interest seems to have waned a bit. Is a ‘policy fatigue’ contaminating youth employment policies across the EU? Have some timid signs of economic recovery led to youth unemployment being less urgent or are we witnessing the usual policy developments whereby grand EU statements are worn down by political realities and resistance on the ground? In this Policy Brief, Claire Dhéret and Martina Morosi assess the implementation of the Youth Guarantee and provide suggestions on how to renew a sense of enthusiasm for such an ambitious tool across Europe.

Collateral and Credit Rationing. The role of collateral in explaining and remediating the limited flow of credit to households and SMEs. ECRI Policy Brief No. 7, February 2014

European-wide data concerning both companies and households indicate that the credit rationing phenomenon, which has been predicted by theory, does in fact occur to a significant degree in the European credit market. Among SMEs, micro companies are most vulnerable and the current economic crisis has only made these concerns more pressing. Top-down use of the monetary transmission mechanism alone is insufficient to counter the problem. The other solution consists of a bottom-up, microeconomic stimulation of lending transactions, by focusing on collateral and guarantees. The data confirm the high importance that lenders – especially individual households and micro companies – attach to collateral and guarantees when making their lending decisions. As a consequence, we would argue that those parts of the law governing security interests and guarantees should be one of the primary targets for government policy aimed at improving credit flows, especially in avoiding a conflict between consumer protection measures and laws on surety and guarantees. This policy brief firstly aims to give an overview of the problem of credit rationing and to show that low-income households and SMEs are most concerned by the phenomenon. Focusing solely on loans as a way of financing and on the issues related to access to finance by micro and small companies as well households, it then sketches possible solutions focused on guarantees. This paper brings together data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption survey (HFCS), Eurostat, and both the latest wave of the extended biennial EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance of SMEs (EC/ECB SAFE 2013) and the latest wave of the smaller semi-annual ECB SAFE Survey, covering the period between October 2012 and March 2013.

Simulation of Land Use and Investment Behaviour under Different Policy Scenarios: Results of the extended farm/household model. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 27, July 2012

Factor markets are a central issue in analyses of farm development and of agricultural sector vitality. Among the different production factors, land is one of the most studied. Several studies seek to estimate the effect of government policy payments on land value or land rental prices. The studies mostly agree that government payments and other types of policy support are significant in explaining land prices and account for a large share of them. In October 2011, the European Commission published a new policy proposal for the common agricultural policy (CAP) up to 2020. The proposed regulation includes a shift from historical to regional payments. The objective of this paper is to provide an ex ante analysis of the impact of the new CAP policy instruments on the land market. In particular, the effect of the regionalisation of payments in Italy is examined. The analysis is based on the use of a mathematical programming model to simulate the changes in land demand for a farm in Emilia Romagna. The results highlight the relevance of the new policy mechanism in determining a change in land demand. Yet the effect is highly dependent on initial ownership of entitlements under the historical payment scheme.

Die EU-Volksabstimmungen in Österreich, Finnland, Schweden und Norwegen. Verlauf, Ergebnisse Motive und Folgen = The EU referendums in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway. Results, motives and consequences. Institute for Advanced Studies Political Science Series No. 23, 1995

This paper analysis the 1994 EU referenda in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway in a comparative perspective. It shows that the results were, to some extent at least, related to how pronounced the respective elite consensus was on the necessity or desirability of EU membership. It also shows that in all cases the main motivation of the Yes voters was economic. The paper goes on to analyse the regional and social variations in voting patterns. In the concluding chapter some of the medium- and longterm effects of the referenda debates and results on Austrian, Finnish and Swedish government policy within the EU are outlined.

Big business in Belarus - its genesis, conditions and prospects. OSW Commentary No. 113, 2013-09-09

Over the past ten to twenty years, Belarus has seen a steep rise in the number of local dollar millionaires. This has somewhat undermined the myth of an egalitarian model of society promoted through the Belarusian state propaganda. There is a small group of businessmen among the top earners who, in exchange for their political loyalty and their consent to share profits with those in power, have enjoyed a number of privileges that allow them to safely conduct business in an environment typically hostile to private enterprise. The favourable conditions under which they are operating have enabled them not only to accumulate substantial capital, but also to invest it abroad. However, since such businesses are seen as providing a financial safety net for the regime, in 2011 and 2012 some of their directors received an EU travel ban, while their companies were subjected to economic sanctions by Brussels. At the same time, fearing that Belarus’s big business could become powerful enough to influence the country’s political scene (as has been the case in Russia and Ukraine), Alexander Lukashenka has actively prevented such players from becoming too independent. Consequently, Belarus has so far not developed its own elite class of oligarchs who would be able to actively influence government policy. The current informal agreement between the government in Minsk and big business has proved stable and is unlikely to change in the near future. Nonetheless, a reordering of state power giving Belarus’s big business significant political influence would be possible should Mr Lukashenka lose power in the next presidential election.

Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/05, 24 September 2013

Recent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recovery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold policies are still needed. There are three central risks. Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt. Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities: Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted. Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.