Does the Stockholm Programme matter? The struggles over ownership of AFSJ multiannual programming. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 51/December 2012

Does the 2009 Stockholm Programme matter? This paper addresses the controversies experienced at EU institutional levels as to ‘who’ should have ownership of the contours of the EU’s policy and legislative multiannual programming in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape. It examines the struggles around the third multiannual programme on the AFSJ, i.e. the Stockholm Programme, and the dilemmas affecting its implementation. The latest affair to emerge relates to the lack of fulfilment by the European Commission of the commitment to provide a mid-term evaluation of the Stockholm Programme’s implementation by mid-2012, as requested by both the Council and the European Parliament. This paper shifts the focus to a broader perspective and raises the following questions: Is the Stockholm Programme actually relevant? What do the discussions behind its implementation tell us about the new institutional dynamics affecting European integration on the AFSJ? Does the EU actually need a new (post- Stockholm) multiannual programme for the period 2015–20? And last, what role should the EP play in legislative and policy programming in order to further strengthen the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU’s AFSJ?

Holes in the skies over NATO's Central European member states. OSW Commentary No. 119, 22.10.2013

Over the past few months, four Central European states have made decisions which will determine the shape of their air forces over the next decade. On 11 October, Romania signed a contract under which it will buy twelve used US F-16A/B multi-role fighter aircraft from Portugal. In August, Slovakia signed contracts with Russia’s MiG for repairs and the limited modernisation of its twelve MiG-29 fighter aircraft currently in service. The Czech Republic entered into a preliminary agreement in July with Sweden on extending the lease of fourteen JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft (the new Czech government will hammer out the details following the parliamentary election). Bulgaria, which has been facing financial problems and political instability, in June postponed the purchase of new (non-Soviet) combat aircraft at least until the end of this year. If Sofia decides to buy any within the next few years, these will be not more than twelve relatively old and worn-out machines (most likely F-16A/B from Portuguese or Dutch army surplus). Given the fact that Hungary in 2012 made the same decision regarding its fourteen Gripen aircraft as the Czech Republic, there are good grounds to claim that the capabilities Central European NATO member states have to take action in airspace are durably limited. The region’s saturation with combat aircraft is the lowest when compared to the entire continent (with the exception of the Baltic states). Furthermore, the machines to be used in the coming decade will be the oldest and the least advanced technologically (all of them belong to the so-called “fourth generation”, the roots of which date back to the 1970s). The problem with gaining full interoperability within NATO has not been resolved in its Central European member states. By modernising its MiG-29 aircraft, Slovakia is to say the least postponing the achievement of interoperability once again. Bulgaria will gain interoperability by buying any Western combat aircraft. However, it is very unlikely to introduce new machines into service earlier than at the end of the present decade. Since the introduction of new fifth generation multi-role combat aircraft or transitional 4+ generation machines in the region’s air forces is unrealistic, the defence of the airspace of NATO member states in Central Europe can be termed an ever more porous sky.