A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom's monopoly on exports. OSW Commentary No. 121, 26.11.2013

An act restricting Gazprom’s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conducted for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom’s competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. The ‘liberalisation’ they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom’s competitors, they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia’s share on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road to breaking Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system.

On Ukrainian Gas Transit and South Stream. There may be more than meets the eye. CEPS Commentaries, 21 March 2014

The EU relies to a considerable degree on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Whereas Norwegian export pipelines are directly connected to the EU gas system, a major share of Russian gas flows through the Ukrainian territory before reaching consumers located other consumers located down in the supply chain (e.g. Slovakia, Hungary or Italy). But is the Ukrainian gas transit route still a risk? Will the construction of the South Stream pipeline further reduce the importance of Ukraine as a transit country? Or is there more at stake here than meets the eye?