Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 205/31.03.2016

Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy and its enhanced military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region has led to revaluations in Sweden’s and Finland’s security and defence policies and a rethinking of the formats of their military co-operation. While remaining outside NATO, the two states have been developing closer bilateral defence co-operation and working more closely with the United States, while at the same time developing co-operation with NATO. Sweden and Finland perceive the United States as the guarantor of regional and European security. From their point of view, the United States is currently the country that has both the necessary military capabilities and the political will to react in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, in which both countries would inevitably become involved despite their non-aligned status. For Sweden and Finland, intensified co-operation with the United States offers an alternative to NATO membership, which is currently out of the question for domestic political reasons. Meanwhile, the US has also become increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the two states, which, for the purposes of contingency planning, are in fact an extension of NATO’s north-eastern flank.

Safeguarding the EDTIB: the Case for Supervising non-EU FDI in the Defence Sector. Security Policy Brief No. 41, December 2012

It is time for the EU member states to start collectively supervising non-EU FDI in Europe’s defence industries and infrastructures. This should be a prudent element of the nascent EDTIB and a way to maintain European security by encouraging greater coordination between the national supervisory frameworks.

And what will Europe do? The European Council and military strategy. Security Policy Brief No. 46, May 2013

Important decisions on Europe’s military capabilities are expected from the December 2013 European Council. But why? What do Europeans actually want to do with their capabilities? The answer to that question would be the crowning piece of the European Council’s decisions.

The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence. CEPS Policy Brief No. 310, 19 December 2013

The true causes of the EU’s inertia as a security actor in its neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward, argues Giovanni Faleg. Member states are reluctant to set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.

Building European Defence: An Architect and a Bank. Security Policy Brief No. 56, May 2014

If a set of investors plan a grand apartment building in which they can each afford just one apartment, they need an architect to design a building that is both affordable and that meets all their needs, to negotiate with the constructor, and to ensure follow-up. When building capabilities for European defence, the sole possible architect is the European Defence Agency (EDA). Those who have to reach consensus and invest are the EU Member States. And there is even a European Investment Bank (EIB) to assist them.