Towards Better Use of Credit Reporting in Europe. CEPS-ECRI Task Force Report, September 2013

This report discusses how the current EU credit reporting systems meet the demands of the different stakeholders in the credit granting and management process, and what is needed to improve these systems. As credit reporting is a tool for responsible lending and for ensuring financial inclusion of consumers, it argues that the needs of EU credit markets and consumers should be the basis for assessing the current regulation and its functionality. How a creditor assesses the risk and the creditworthiness of a customer is at the core of successful and safe crediting. Facilitating this assessment process, within the boundaries of data protection laws, is a key building block for making well-informed credit decisions.

Collateral and Credit Rationing. The role of collateral in explaining and remediating the limited flow of credit to households and SMEs. ECRI Policy Brief No. 7, February 2014

European-wide data concerning both companies and households indicate that the credit rationing phenomenon, which has been predicted by theory, does in fact occur to a significant degree in the European credit market. Among SMEs, micro companies are most vulnerable and the current economic crisis has only made these concerns more pressing. Top-down use of the monetary transmission mechanism alone is insufficient to counter the problem. The other solution consists of a bottom-up, microeconomic stimulation of lending transactions, by focusing on collateral and guarantees. The data confirm the high importance that lenders – especially individual households and micro companies – attach to collateral and guarantees when making their lending decisions. As a consequence, we would argue that those parts of the law governing security interests and guarantees should be one of the primary targets for government policy aimed at improving credit flows, especially in avoiding a conflict between consumer protection measures and laws on surety and guarantees. This policy brief firstly aims to give an overview of the problem of credit rationing and to show that low-income households and SMEs are most concerned by the phenomenon. Focusing solely on loans as a way of financing and on the issues related to access to finance by micro and small companies as well households, it then sketches possible solutions focused on guarantees. This paper brings together data from the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption survey (HFCS), Eurostat, and both the latest wave of the extended biennial EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance of SMEs (EC/ECB SAFE 2013) and the latest wave of the smaller semi-annual ECB SAFE Survey, covering the period between October 2012 and March 2013.

Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013

This paper describes and compares the institutional framework of the agricultural credit markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in situations where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries. The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. The financial experts all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

Drivers of agricultural capital productivity in selected EU member states. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 30, September 2012

The aim of this Working Paper is to provide an empirical analysis of the marginal return on working capital and fixed capital in agriculture, based on data gathered by the Farm Accountancy Data Network from seven EU member states. Particular emphasis is placed on the detection of credit market imperfections. The key idea is to provide farm group-specific estimates of the shadow price of capital, and to use these to analyse the drivers of on-farm capital use in European agriculture. Based on Cobb Douglas estimates of farm-type specific production functions, we find that working capital is typically used in more than economically optimal quantities and often displays negative marginal returns across countries and farm types. This is less often the case with regard to fixed capital, but it is only in a small set of sectors where access to fixed capital appears severely constrained. These sectors include field crop and mixed farms in Denmark, dairy farms in East Germany, as well as mixed farms in Italy and the UK. The relationship between farm financial indicators and the estimated shadow prices of capital varies considerably across countries and sectors. Among the farms with a high shadow price for fixed capital in Denmark, high debt levels and little owned land tended to induce more intensive capital use, which may reflect the liberal Danish banking system. In East Germany, Italy and the UK, high debt levels made farmers more tightly capital constrained. Hence, in the latter group of countries, more traditional mechanisms of capital allocation based on debt capacity seemed to be at work. As a general conclusion, EU agriculture appears to be characterised by overcapitalisation rather than by credit constraints.

Simulation Results of AgriPoliS about Diminishing Capital Subsidies and Restrictions. Factor Markets Working Document No. 55, June 2013

This paper investigates the impacts of high interest rates for borrowed capital and credit restrictions on the structural development of four European regions. The method used is the model AgriPoliS which is a spatial-dynamic agent-based model. It is able to provide aggregated results at the regional level, but very individual results as well by considering farms as independent entities. Farms can choose between different investment options during the simulation. Several scenarios with different interest rates for borrowed capital on the one hand as well as with different levels of credit restrictions on the other hand are tested and compared. Results show that higher interest rates have less impact on declining production branches than on expanding ones. If they have the possibility farms invest in the most profitable production branch which relative profitability might have changed with high interest rates. Credit restrictions lead farms to choose smaller and cheaper investments than expensive and large ones. Results also show that income losses in both cases due to under-investment compared to the reference situation are partially compensated by lower rental prices. The impacts on structural change also differ depending on the region and the initial situation. In summary, credit subsidies or imperfections on credit markets might have indirect impacts on the type of dominant investment and therefore on the whole regional agricultural sector as well.

Determinants of Financial Development across the Mediterranean. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 29/February 2013

Casual observation shows that that the financial systems in the southern and eastern Mediterranean are unable (or unwilling) to divert the financial resources that are available to them as funding opportunities to private enterprises. Using a sample of both northern and southern Mediterranean countries for the years 1985 to 2009, this study empirically assesses the reasons underlying such conditions. The results show that strong legal institutions, good democratic governance and adequate implementation of financial reforms can have a substantial positive impact on financial development only when they are present collectively. Moreover, inflation appears to undermine banking development, but less so when the capital account is open. Government debt growth appears to weaken credit growth, which confirms that public debt ‘crowds out’ private debt. Lastly, capital inflows appear to primarily have an income effect, increasing income and thereby national savings, and thus increasing the availability of credit.

Where is the credit crunch in Greece? CEPS Commentary, 6 October 2015

Greek policy-makers like to make the point that their economy cannot recover because of a lack of credit and that this affects exports, in particular. Austerity is an easy explanation for the weakness of domestic demand, argues Daniel Gros in this CEPS Commentary, but it is more difficult to see why Greek exports have stagnated in recent years. The author considers the argument that the Greek economy could not recover via export-led growth because of a credit crunch. The overall availability of credit was higher than GDP, and interest rates remained relatively low. There is some indication of a misallocation of bank credit, but the responsibility for any mistakes in this direction must lie squarely with the government and the Troika, given that the Greek banking system has been under government control since 2012.

A Convergence Process in Household Credit in Central and Eastern Europe. ECRI Commentary No. 16, 30 October 2015

The liberalisation of Eastern Europe’s market during the 1990s and the 2004 EU enlargement have had a great impact on the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Indeed, prior to these events, the financial system and household credit markets in CEE were underdeveloped. Nonetheless, it appeared to numerous economists that the development of the CEE financial system and credit markets was following an intensely positive trend, raising the question of sustainability. Many variables impact the level and growth rate of credit; several economists point out that a convergence process might be one of the most important. Using a descriptive statistics approach, it seems likely that a convergence process began during the 1990s, when the CEE countries opened their economies. However, it also seems that the main driver of this household credit convergence process is the GDP per capita convergence process. Indeed, credit to households and GDP per capita have followed broadly similar tendencies over the last 20 years and it has been shown in the literature that they appear to influence each other. The consistency of this potential convergence process is also confirmed by the breakdown of household credit by type and maturity. There is a tendency towards similar household credit markets in Europe. However, it seems that this potential convergence process was slowed down by the financial crisis. Fortunately, the crisis also stabilised the share of loans in foreign currency in CEE countries. This might add more stability to credit markets in Eastern Europe.

Tough love for sinners in the eurozone banking union. CEPS Commentary, 1 July 2013

The ministers of finance and the economy of the eurozone have now agreed on the main features of a new ESM instrument for the direct recapitalisation of euro area banks (Eurogroup, 2013) and on a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions (Council of the European Union, 2013). However, as Stefano Micossi explains in this Commentary, the text that has come out of the frantic late-night negotiations in the Ecofin Council seems to leave unwelcome uncertainty as to the real scope of the new rules in the different national jurisdictions, while the lack of depositor preference in the bail-in pecking order may result in destabilisation. The proposed system appears not only highly intrusive but it also places a considerable burden of aid to the failing institution on the member state, raising doubts about its ability to “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”.