The Second Phase of the Common European Asylum System: A Step Forward in the Protection of Asylum Seekers? IES WORKING PAPER 7/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse what is the impact of the second phase of the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the protection of rights of Asylum Seekers in the European Union. The establishment of a CEAS has been always a part of the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Its implementation was planned in two phases: the first one, focused on the harmonisation of internal legislation on minimum common standards; the second, based on the result of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the agreed legal instruments, should improve the effectiveness of the protection granted. The five instruments adopted between 2002 and 2005, three Directives, on Qualification, Reception Conditions and Asylum Procedures, and two Regulations, the so-called “Dublin System”, were subjected to an extensive evaluation and modification, which led to the end of the recasting in 2013. The paper discusses briefly the international obligations concerning the rights of asylum seekers and continues with the presentation of the legal basis of the CEAS and its development, together with the role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in asylum matters. The research will then focus on the development in the protection of asylum seekers after the recasting of the legislative instruments mentioned above. The paper will note that the European standards result now improved, especially concerning the treatment of vulnerable people, the quality of the application procedure, the effectiveness of the appeal, the treatment of gender issues in decision concerning procedures and reception. However, it will be also highlighted that Member States maintained a wide margin of appreciation in many fields, which can lead to the compression of important guarantees. This margin concerns, for example, the access to free legal assistance, the definition of the material support to be granted to each applicant for international protection, the access to labour market, the application of the presumptions of the “safety” of a third country. The paper will therefore stress that the long negotiations that characterised the second phase of the CEAS undoubtedly led to some progress in the protection of Asylum Seekers in the EU. However, some provisions are still in open contrast with the international obligations concerning rights of asylum seekers, while others require to the Member State consider carefully its obligation in the choice of internal policies concerning asylum matters.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

Survey on Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 57, 30 August 2013

This paper offers a picture of the obligations existing under international and European law in respect of the loss of nationality. It describes international instruments including obligations in this field with direct relevancy for the loss of nationality of Member States of the European Union, but also obligations regarding loss of nationality in regional non-European treaties. Attention is given to two important judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice (Janko Rottmann) and the European Court of Human Rights (Genovese v Malta) regarding nationality. Special attention is devoted to Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which forbids the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. A survey is provided of possible sub-principles that can be derived from this rule. Finally, some observations are made on the burden of proof in cases of loss of nationality.