Innovative Capabilities and Market Performance: The European Union in International Comparison. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 7, September 2012

This paper investigates the EU’s international positioning in terms of innovative capabilities and global market performance by using most recent quantitative data on a wide branch of indicators. The EU’s performance is compared to the standings of its most important economic competitors and emerging economic powerhouses: the USA, Japan, China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa. By doing so, this paper offer insightful and deep information about the EU’s power to compete and rank in international economic affairs. It will be proofed that the European Union ranks in many of the indicators related to innovative capabilities in good position and the EU’s overall global market performance is excellent, whereas the BRICS are underachieving.

What Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Regarding Subsidiarity within the EU Institutional Framework?

he principle of subsidiarity refers in general to the choice of the most suitable and efficient level for taking policy action. The European Union associates subsidiarity with the way of taking decisions ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’, as it is referred to in the EU treaties. Thus, ensuring the respect of subsidiarity within the EU legislative framework ensures that any EU action is justified when proposing draft legislative acts. The Lisbon Treaty establishes new mechanisms reinforcing subsidiarity control, both ex ante and ex post the EU legislative process, and by doing so, enhances mainly the role of the national parliaments (and to a lesser extent the regional parliaments) and the Committee of the Regions. But in the end, this is a way of ensuring legitimacy of the EU action as it is quite often questioned, especially in times of crisis. Years of practice will tell whether the words will join reality.

European Policy Uses of International Comparisons of Academic Achievement. ACES Working Papers, 2012

International large-scale assessments (ILSAs) and the resulting ranking of countries in key academic subjects have become increasingly significant in the development of global performance indicators and national level reforms in education. As one of the largest international surveys, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has had a considerable impact on the world of international comparisons of education. Based on the results of these assessments, claims are often made about the relative success or failure of education systems, and in some cases, such as Germany or Japan, ILSAs have sparked national level reforms (Ertl, 2006; Takayama, 2007, 2009). In this paper, I offer an analysis of how PISA is increasingly used as a key reference both for a regional2 entity like the European Union (EU) and for national level performance targets in the example of Spain (Breakspear, 2012). Specifically, the paper examines the growth of OECD and EU initiatives in defining quality education, and the use of both EU benchmarks and PISA in defining the education indicators used in Spain to measure and set goals for developing quality education. By doing so, this paper points to the role of the OECD and the EU in national education systems. It therefore adds to a body of literature pointing to the complex relationship between international, regional, and national education policy spaces (cf. Dale & Robertson, 2002; Lawn & Grek, 2012; Rizvi & Lingard, 2009).

Banking Union: are the EMU design mistakes being repeated? European Policy Brief No. 12, October 2012

This Policy Brief pleads for an unambiguous commitment by eurozone leaders to establishing a Banking Union that is based on all three of its pillars: common supervision, a single bank resolution authority and a joint deposit insurance. There is a clear risk that the EU will agree on common supervision, but subsequently fails to put in place the remaining elements of its Banking Union. By doing so, the EU would make the same mistake as when it designed EMU, namely, creating a system with built-in flaws that risks leading to huge costs and a questioning of the European project as such.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

A Global Strategy for a soul-searching European Union. EPC Discussion Paper, 13 July 2016

On 28 June 2016, just a few days after the historic Brexit vote, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini presented the paper on the new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) at the European Council, outlining the strategic coordinates for the EU’s foreign and security policy. In this Discussion Paper, Giovanni Grevi takes a closer look at the EUGS and assesses its main rationale, features, added value and prospects against the backdrop of an ever more complex world. Not only is the EU dealing with increasingly contested and polarised politics at home, but the global theatre itself has become hugely disorienting, more integrated and yet more fragmented at the same time. The paper recalibrates the overall foreign policy posture of the EU and sketches out a more modest and concrete approach compared to earlier aspirations, and a more joined-up one compared to current practice. By doing so, the strategy seeks to square the circle between the need for Europe to be cohesive and purposeful in a harder strategic environment and the fact that domestic politics within the Union constrain its external action and drain its attractiveness. The EUGS calls on the EU and member states to fully take on their responsibility to underpin unity, prosperity and security at home by taking more effective and joined-up action abroad. The question is, of course, whether this call will be heeded.