Confidentiala "Mode 3" Systems Approach for Knowledge Creation, Diffusion and Use: Towards a 21st Century Fractal Innovation Ecosystem. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 4, 2007

"Mode 3" allows and emphasizes the co-existence and co-evolution of different knowledge and innovation paradigms: the competitiveness and superiority of a knowledge system is highly determined by its adaptive capacity to combine and integrate different knowledge and innovation modes via co-evolution, co-specialization and coopetition [sic] of knowledge stock and flow dynamics. What results is an emerging fractal knowledge and innovation ecosystem, well-configured for the knowledge economy and society. The intrinsic litmus test of the capacity of such an ecosystem to survive and prosper in the context of continually glocalizing [sic] and intensifying competition represents the ultimate competitiveness benchmark with regards to the robustness and quality of the ecosystem's knowledge and innovation architecture and topology.

Knowledge-Bearing Elites and Industrial Performance in France and Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.5, December 1993

Most comparative studies of public policies for competitiveness focus on the links among public agencies and industrial sectors. This paper argues that the professions---or knowledge-bearing elites-that animate these organizational links are equally significant. For public policies to promote technological advance, the visions and self-images of knowledge-bearing elites are par­ ticularly important. By examining administrative and technical elites in France and Germany in the 1980s, the paper identifies characteristics that enable these elites to implement policy in some cases, but not in others. France's "state-created" elites were well-positioned to initiate and implement large technology projects, such as digitizing the telecommunications network. Germany's state-recognized elites were, by contrast, better positioned to facilitate framework­ oriented programs that aimed at the diffusion of new technologies throughout industry. The linkages among administrative and technical elites also explain why French policymakers had difficulty adapting policy to changing circumstances over time while German policymakers managed in many cases to learn more from previous policy experiences and to adapt subsequent initiatives accordingly.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.

Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the Labyrinth. CEPS Working Document No. 370, October 2012

Private governance is currently being evoked as a viable solution to many public policy goals. However, in some circumstances it has shown to produce more harm than good, and even disastrous consequences as in the case of the financial crisis that is raging in most advanced economies. Although the current track record of private regulatory schemes is mixed, policy guidance documents around the world still require that policy-makers give priority to self- and co-regulation, with little or no additional guidance being given to policymakers to devise when, and under what circumstances, these solutions can prove viable from a public policy perspective. With an array of examples from several policy fields, this paper approaches regulation as a public-private collaborative form and attempts to identify possible policy tools to be applied by public policy-makers to efficiently and effectively approach private governance as a solution, rather than a problem. We propose a six-step theoretical framework and argue that IA techniques should: i) define an integrated framework including both the possibility that private regulation can be used as an alternative or as a complement to public legislation; ii) involve private parties in public IAs in order to define the best strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement of the regulatory objectives; and iii) contemplate the deployment of indicators related to governance and activities of the regulators and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes with other regulators.

The use of innovative financial instruments for financing EU policies and objectives: Implications for EU and national budgets. CEPS Special Report, October 2012

This CEPS Special Report analyses the proposed expansion of innovative financial instruments in the EU Multiannual Financial Framework for the 2014–20 period. It presents the economic rationale, governance principles and criteria that these instruments should follow and compares these with proposals from the European Commission. Based on this assessment, it makes recommendations for the proposed instruments.