8 resultados para Kim, Jaegwon: Physicalism, or something near enough
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
Is it really true that the economic processes described as globalization are eroding West European and North Ameri can welfare states (WS) ? This paper is a first step in a project aimed at answering the question. Focusing on conflict ing arguments about the economic mechanisms which generate pressures on WS, it groups them into three answers to the title question: globalization has everything, nothing, or something to do with it. Tentatively concluding that the third answer, that domestic and international economic mechanisms do interact in specific ways to strain WS, it sets the stage for the second stage of the project. That is to analyze the political mechanisms shaping the policy re sponses to those strains and perhaps themselves contributing to those strains. To expore the issues to be addressed in this second step. a brief preliminary exploration of recent social policy patterns suggests that domestic political fac tors go a long way toward explaining them without much recourse to globalization, especially in the U.S. but also, if to a lesser extent, in Western Europe.
Resumo:
In recent months Kyiv has been intensifying its efforts to diversify Ukraine’s gas supply routes with a view to reducing the country’s dependence on imports from Russia. One of the steps which Kyiv has taken has been to make the unprecedented decision to start importing gas from its Western neighbours. In November 2012, Ukraine’s state-owned Naftogaz began importing gas through Poland under a two-month contract with RWE (the imports continued into 2013 under a separate deal), while in the spring of 2013 Ukraine started importing gas from Hungary. Kyiv is also currently looking into the possibility of purchasing gas from Slovakia. Furthermore, since 2010 the Ukrainian government has been working on the construction of an LNG terminal near Odesa. The authorities have declared that this will allow Ukraine to import up to 5 billion m3 of LNG a year by 2015. The government has also taken measures to increase domestic production, including from non-traditional sources, and it plans to replace gas-based with coal-based technologies in local power stations. Finally, in January 2013, the government signed a 50-year production sharing agreement with Shell. This paves the way for the development of Ukraine’s shale gas deposits.
Resumo:
The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.
Resumo:
In order to evaluate the success of a society, measuring well-being might be a fruitful avenue. For a long time, governments have trusted economic measures, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in particular, to assess their success. However GDP is only a limited measure of economic success, which is not enough to show whether policies implemented by governments have a positive perceived impact on the people they represent. This paper belongs to the studies of the relationship between measures of well-being and economic factors. More precisely, it tries to evaluate the decrease in happiness and life satisfaction that can be observed in European countries in the 2000-2010 decade. It asks whether this deterioration is mainly due to microeconomic factors, such as income and individual characteristics, or rather to environmental (macroeconomics) factors such as unemployment, inflation or income inequality. Such aggregate factors could impact individual happiness per se because they are related to the perception of an aggregate risk of unemployment or income fall. In order to strengthen this interpretation, this paper checks whether the type of social protection regime existing in different countries mediates the impact of macroeconomic volatility on individual well-being. To go further, adopting the classification of welfare regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990), it verifies whether the decreasing pattern of subjective well-being varies across these regimes. This is partly due to the aggregate social protection expenditure. Hence, this paper brings some additional evidence to the idea that macroeconomic uncertainty has a cost in terms of well-being. More protective social regimes are able to reduce this cost. It also proposes an evaluation of the welfare cost of unemployment and inflation (in terms of happiness and life satisfaction), in each of the different social protection regimes. Finally different measures of well-being, i.e. cognitive, hedonic and eudaimonic, are used to confirm the above mentioned result.
Resumo:
Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.
Resumo:
A China whose economy is growing at a slower pace is something the world can cope with. But a China with doubts about whether the government can maintain control and implement reform – that would be a serious problem. The signals currently coming from the economic and political spheres are cause for concern. China is in danger of falling into a downward spiral of declining confidence. What are the consequences for Germany?
Resumo:
Despite all the evidence presented by a range of respected figures and institutions, and the paucity of the arguments on the Brexit side, which failed to set out the alternative to EU membership, the emotional appeal for ‘independence’ has won. This is a bad day for Europe. The Bremain campaign has not connected with enough voters, with the perceived need to limit migration, the wish to make decisions independent of the EU and a vote against ‘the establishment’ all seemingly playing a role.