Does the key to a WMD-free Middle East lie in a nuclear Iran? CEPS Commentary, 10 June 2013

After the presidential elections on June 14th, the Iranian regime will continue its catch-me-if-you-can game with the international community until it has reached the nuclear threshold. Paradoxically, the key to a solution on the nuclear issue might just lie in discussions on a WMD-free Middle East, but only after Iran has obtained nuclear military capability. At that point, and in the context of a new arms race, both regional and international players may be persuaded that the Middle East has more to gain from negotiations on non-proliferation than from prolonged isolation and the prospect of intractable war.

Banking system soundness is the key to more SME financing. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/10, July 2013

The SME access-to-finance problem is not universal in the European Union and there are reasons for the fall in credit aggregates and higher SME lending rates in southern Europe. Possible market failures, high unemployment and externalities justify making greater and easier access to finance for SMEs a top priority. Previous European initiatives were able to support only a tiny fraction of Europe’s SMEs; merely stepping-up these programmes is unlikely to result in a breakthrough. Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, initiatives to help SMEs get access to finance will have limited success. The European Central Bank can foster bank recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the asset quality review before it takes over the single supervisory role. Of the possible initiatives for fostering SME access to finance, a properly designed scheme for targeted central bank lending seems to be the best complement to the banking clean-up, but other options, such as increased European Investment Bank lending and the promotion of securitisation of SME loans, should also be explored.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

Cities: The Juncker Commission should not miss this key to growth, jobs and the environment. CEPS Commentary, 3 October 2014

Cities, more particularly ‘smart’ cities, could become a catalyst for economic and social development. For this to happen, Europe will need a new type of integrated infrastructure, a new urban governance and policy structure, as well as new finance and business models. Successful smart projects will eventually develop into new business models and companies. While the European Commission cannot mandate or regulate this top down, it has a role to play in nurturing new initiatives to allow Europe the possibility of developing its own Google and Apple.

Investment as the key to recovery in the euro area? CEPS Policy Brief No. 326, 18 November 2014

Investment has declined in the euro area since the start of the economic and financial crisis, but this does not mean that there is necessarily an ‘investment gap’, explains Daniel Gros in this CEPS Policy Brief. Investment was probably above a sustainable level due to the credit boom before 2007. Moreover, the fall in the euro area’s potential growth − due to a combination of a sharp demographic slowdown and lower total factor productivity (TFP) growth − should also lead to a permanently lower investment rate. Increasing the investment rate might thus be the wrong target for economic policy. The author advises that the aim of economic policy should be to increase consumption, rather than investment overall. Increasing infrastructure investment might be justified in some member countries, but it is not a ‘free lunch’ when efficiency levels are low, which seems to be the case in some of the financially stressed euro area countries.

Breaking down the barriers to firm growth in Europe: The fourth EFIGE policy report. Bruegel Blueprint 18, 28 August 2012

Large firms contribute disproportionately to the economic performance of countries: they are more productive, pay higher wages, enjoy higher profits and are more successful in international markets. The differences between European countries in terms of the size of their firms are stark. Firms in Italy and Spain, for example, are on average 40 percent smaller than firms in Germany. The low average firm size translates into a chronic lack of large firms. In Italy and Spain, a mere 5 percent of manufacturing firms have more than 250 employees, compared to a much higher 11 percent in Germany. Understanding the roots of these differences is key to improving the economic performance of Europe’s lagging economies. So why is there so much variation in firm size in different European countries? What are the barriers that keep firms in some countries from growing? And which policies are likely to be most effective in breaking down those barriers? This policy report aims to answer these questions by developing a quantitative model of the seven European countries covered by the EFIGE survey (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the UK). The EFIGE survey asked 14,444 firms in those countries about their performance, their modes of internationalisation, their staffing decisions, their financing structure, and their competitive environment, among other topics.

Access Barriers to Services Markets: Mapping, tracing, understanding and measuring. CEPS Special Report No. 77, June 2013

EU and national policy-makers argue that the single services market is a key to EU growth, but that many barriers to services market access remain. Grasping the scope, nature and economic meaning of these barriers, however, has proven rather difficult. This is exactly what the present CEPS Special Report helps the reader to do. We trace all market access barriers in services, as far as the data allow, and attempt to understand their nature and economic meaning (given that they are usually forms of domestic regulation) and discuss aspects of the measurement of restrictiveness. We make a sharp distinction between market access barriers restrictions in a non-EU WTO/GATS environment and intra-EU ones, and demonstrate the significant difference in ambition between the two. The paper specifies in detail the progress made by the EU's horizontal reform in services markets, documenting the removal of many cross-border obstacles to trade in services and establishment. Finally, following these conceptual and descriptive analyses, a brief assessment of access restrictiveness indices is provided for both the non-EU WTO environment and for intra-EU services access barriers.

La disoccupazione giovanile in tempo di crisi: un monito all’Europa (continentale) per rifondare il diritto del lavoro? = Youth Unemployment in Recessionary Times: a Caveat to (Continental) Europe to Reconstruct its Labour Law. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 91/2012

The current debate taking place in continental Europe on the need to reform labour law to reduce the duality between labour market insiders and outsiders, thus giving new employment opportunities to young people seems to be, at its best, a consequence of the crisis, or at its worst, an excuse. The considerable emphasis placed on the power of legislation to reduce youth unemployment prevents real labour market problems from being clearly identified, thus reducing the scope to adopt more effective measures. Action is certainly required to help young people during the current crisis, yet interventions should not be exclusively directed towards increased flexibility and deregulation. This paper questions the “thaumaturgic power” wrongly attributed to legislative interventions and put forward a more holistic approach to solve the problem of youth employment, by focusing on the education systems, school-to-work transition and industrial relations. As a comparative analysis demonstrates, in order to effectively tackle the issue of youth employment, it is not enough to reform labour law. High quality education systems, apprenticeship schemes, efficient placement and employment services, cooperative industrial relations and flexible wage determination mechanisms are the key to success when it comes to youth employment, not only in times of recession.

Why trying to keep the Germans close on EU competences is risky for Britain. EPIN Commentary No. 13, 3 December 2013

A new Commentary published by the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) offers an interesting piece of advice to the UK if it is to succeed in winning over Germany on EU reform. The author, Almut Möller, asserts that the UK needs to understand how Germany’s federal system, with its intricate balance of competences between the various levels, is an integral part of modern Germany and key to the country’s thinking on Europe.

Ukraine – Trying to build a future beyond the past. EPC Commentary, 2 June 2014

On 25 May Ukrainian businessman Petro Poroshenko became Ukraine’s fifth President, winning in the first round with some 54% of the vote, far ahead of Yulia Tymoshenko. While Poroshenko has been involved in Ukrainian politics for several years, including a short stint in the government of disposed President Viktor Yanukovych, his support and involvement in the EuroMaiden anti-government protests, along with the decision of Vitali Klitschko to drop out of the presidential race and support Poroshenko’s candidacy, were key to his success.