Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

The reform of the EU courts (II). Abandoning the management approach by doubling the General Court. Egmont Paper 83, March 2016

The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system. This long legislative debate was the first implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the judicial domain. It has revealed different problems – formal and substantial – of the approach of public service reform in the European institutions.

Social Policy Reforms in the EU: A Cross-national Comparison. Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM) – Reform Barometer. Pilot Study

European countries are losing momentum for social policy reforms: The results of the SIM Europe Index report on social justice, published in September 2014, suggested a growing social divide among the member states. Assessing six policy areas of social inclusion, the data revealed the deteriorating social situation since 2009 across the EU. The report stressed, in particular, the difficulties southern EU member states were having in coping with the effects of the financial and economic crisis. This second report, the SIM Europe Reform Barometer, takes up these results and delivers two tasks: to impartially assess the extent of problem awareness of governments, and to ask whether they have enacted concrete social policy initiatives to tackle these challenges and to counterbalance the growing divide. Southern European member states, especially, did not or have not been able to pursue reforms to limit their withering levels of a socially inclusive society. In almost all key dimensions of social inclusion, those member states most affected by the implications of the protracted economic and fiscal crisis in the EU have been least able to confine the ongoing ‘internal devaluation’ in terms of socially balanced governmental activity. By contrast, some northern member states have legislated acts which seem well-suited to at least stabilise or even increase their level of social inclusion.