The Role of Pluriactivity in Farm Exit and Labour Supply Decisions. Factor Markets Working Document No. 67, August 2013

EDITED VERSION TO BE PUBLISHED SOON Pluriactivity has been a topic of research in agriculture for the best part of a century. It is a term which has both broad and narrow definitions and hence is subject to multiple interpretations. This paper considers two forms of pluriactivity: within the farm gate pluriactivity, also commonly referred to as farm diversification, and beyond the farm-gate pluriactivity, also known as multiple job holding. Previous studies of pluriactivity have shown that it can inhibit the natural process of structural change in the farm sector, by allowing small and unprofitable farms to survive with the support of income from outside the sector. In this paper, two empirical models of pluriactivity are estimated using farm level data for Ireland. The first examines the impact of on-farm diversification on off-farm labour supply, while the second investigates the relationship between off-farm labour supply and farm exit which is specified in the context of retirement and non-succession. The result of the first model suggests that farms that engage in within the farm gate pluriactivity are less likely to engage in beyond the farm gate pluriactivity, in other words more diversified farmers are less likely to work off farm. The second model confirms previous findings in the literature that part-time farmers have a reduced probability of having a farm successor. While the model results are specific to the Irish case, they do provide some value insights into the impacts of pluriactivity on structural change in farming.

The History and Challenges of Cohesion Policies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 2, February 2014

From Introduction. Regional economic disequilibria was viewed as both an obstacle to and result of integration (European Commission 1965; European Commission 1962; European Commission 1969). Even within the Treaty of Rome, the Community tried to establish mechanisms to alleviate regional inequality. However, it was not until 1975 that the main mechanism of regional policy was established as a result of British and Irish enlargement: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Since then, cohesion policy has become a significant EU expenditure accounting for €347bn, or 35.7% of the total EU budget for 2007-13(European Commission Regional Policy-Info Regio 2012). It has also become a key policy linked to enlargement. The underlying principle of cohesion policy assumes that the market alone cannot solve development problems and therefore government intervention is needed. This notion is in direct contrast to the underlying principle of EU competition policy, which asserts that the free market can solve economic development problems (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). The logic underlying cohesion policy is not only counter to EU competition policy, but also regulatory policies. Unlike other EU policies, cohesion policy is not a sectoral policy, but rather territorial in nature (Leonardi, 2006). Thus at times EU regulatory policy has also unintentionally worked counter to the goals of regional policy, sometimes disadvantaging poorer regions (Dudek, 2005). As the Community has sought to ameliorate regional disparities, it meant that all levels of government: local, regional, national and supranational would need to be involved, however, member states have different territorial governance and European regional development programs have to varying degrees impacted the relationship and policy responsibility of different levels of government (Leonardi, 2006; Bachtler and Michie 1993; Marks, 1993). The very nature of regional development policy has provoked a re-examination of subsidiarity, or which level of government is the lowest and most appropriate level. The discussion of policy formulation and implementation at the lowest level possible also addresses the issue of the democratic deficit. Some argue that the closer government is to the people the more responsive and representative it is. Democracy, however, also implies that public funds are used in a transparent way and for public rather than private good. Yet, as we examine the history and current situation of EU regional funds we find that corruption and misuse still abound. Thus, to understand the history of regional policy it is imperative to look at the major transformations of the policy, how regional policy has impacted subsidiarity and the quality of democracy, become an important instrument of enlargement and contradicted or conflicted with other EU policies.