Will the PRIPs' KID live up to its promise to protect investors? ECMI Commentary No. 33, 6 July 2012

Unveiled by the European Commission on July 3rd, the proposed Regulation on key information documents (KID) for packaged retail investment products (PRIPs) represents a step forward in enhancing the protection of retail investors and advancing the single market for financial services. While acknowledging in this Commentary that the KID is a commendable effort, ECMI/CEPS researcher Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía observes that pre-contractual disclosure is just one of the pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of investor protection and regrets that other pieces, such as MiFID and the IMD, are not so ambitiously constructed.

Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09

In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or in South America). Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce their positions in international markets. The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen to twenty years at the earliest.

Self-Fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: An Empirical Test. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 22 June 2012

This paper tests the hypothesis that government bond markets in the eurozone are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises than in stand-alone countries. We find evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables, and was the result of negative self-fulfilling market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010. We argue that this can drive member countries of the eurozone into bad equilibria. We also find evidence that after years of neglecting high government debt, investors became increasingly worried about this in the eurozone, and reacted by raising the spreads. No such worries developed in stand-alone countries despite the fact that debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables were equally high and increasing in these countries.

Why an ESM programme could be a kiss of death: Recovery values and subordination. CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2012

Spain, needing a bailout for its banks, was granted a vague promise by EZ leaders for up to €100 billion. The details remain obscure, yet they matter enormously. This column argues that the so-called ‘subordination effect’ of fresh official lending could put Spain on the slippery road to ruin. It argues that if sovereign bonds must be bought, this should be done in the secondary market which, would be on an equal footing with private investors and thus avoid the subordination trap.

A simple model of multiple equilibria and default. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 16 July 2012

This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.

What distinguishes the euro crisis from a ‘normal’ financial crisis? CEPS Commentary, 6 November 2012

This Commentary attempts to discern the distinguishing features between the present euro crisis and the financial crisis brought on in the US by the subprime lending disaster and the ensuing collapse of banks and other financial institutions in 2007-08. It finds that whereas the US was able to bring its crisis to an end by socialising the dubious debt and stabilising its valuation so that it could migrate to other investors capable of bearing the risk, this pattern can be only partly repeated in the eurozone, where both debt socialisation and a return to normal risk assessment are more problematic.. It concludes, nevertheless, that the crisis should now abate somewhat given that most risk-averse institutions have by now sold their holdings of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt and especially in light of the ECB’s assurances that it will not allow the euro to disintegrate.

Saving for Retirement and Investing for Growth. Report of the CEPS-RCMI Task Force on Long-term Investing and Retirement Savings. CEPS Task Force Report, September 2013

Europe is facing a double challenge: a significant need for long-term investments – crucial levers for economic growth – and a growing pension gap, both of which call for resolute action. Crucially, at a time when low interest rates and revised prudential standards strain the ability of life insurers and pension funds to offer guaranteed returns, Europe lacks a framework ensuring the quality and accessibility of long-term investment solutions for small retail investors and defined contribution pension plans. This report considers the potential to steer household financial wealth – accounting for over 60% of total financial wealth in Europe – towards long-term investing, which would achieve two goals at once: higher growth and higher pensions. It follows a holistic approach that considers both solution design – how to gear product structuring towards long-term investing – and market structure – how to engineer a competitive market setting that is able to deliver high-quality and cost-efficient solutions. The report also considers prudential rules for insurers and pension funds and the potential to build a single market for less-liquid funds, occupational and personal pensions, with improved investor protection. It urges policy-makers to act aggressively to deliver more inclusive, efficient and resilient retail investment markets that are better equipped and more committed to deliver value over the long-term for beneficiaries.

Transaction Banking: Respecting its role in the real economy. ECRI Policy Brief No. 6, 6 December 2013

This paper sketches the main features and issues related to recent market developments in global transaction banking (GTB), particularly in trade finance, cash management and correspondent banking. It describes the basic functioning of the GTB, its interaction with global financial markets and related implications of global regulatory developments such as Basel III. The interest in GTB has recently increased, since its low-risk profile, tendency to follow growth rates worldwide and relative independence from other financial instruments became an interesting diversification opportunity both for banks’ business models and for investors. Transaction banking has been a resilient business during the crisis, despite the reduction in world trade figures. In the post crisis period, GTB must cope with new challenges related to increased local and global regulation and the risk of inconsistency in regulatory approaches, which could negatively impact the global network and increased competition by new market entrants. Increased sophistication of corporate clients, as well as the pressure to develop and adopt technological innovations more quickly than other areas of banking continues to impact the business. The future of the industry closely depends on its ability to adjust to complex regulatory developments while at the same time being able to operate a global and efficient network.

A Proper Yield Curve for Greece to Kick-Start Financial Intermediation. ECMI Policy Brief No. 21, 10 December 2013

At present, the market is severely mispricing Greece’s sovereign risk relative to the country’s fundamentals. As a result of the mispricing, financial intermediation in Greece has become dysfunctional and the privatisation of state-owned assets has stalled. This mispricing is partially due to an illiquid and fragmented government yield curve. A well-designed public liability management exercise can lead to a more efficient pricing of Greece’s government bonds and thereby help restore stable and affordable financing for the country’s private sector, which is imperative in order to overcome Greece’s deep recession. This paper proposes three measures to enhance the functioning of the Greek government debt market: i) Greece should issue a new five-year bond, ii) it should consolidate the 20 individual series of government bonds into four liquid securities and iii) it should offer investors a swap of these newly created bonds into dollar-denominated securities. Each of these measures would be beneficial to the Hellenic Republic, since the government would be able to reduce the face value and the net present value of its debt stock. Furthermore, this exercise would facilitate the resumption of market access, which is a necessary condition for continuous multilateral disbursements to Greece.

The New EU Climate and Energy Package: Passing the test? CEPS Commentary, 6 January 2014

On 22 January 2014, the European Commission is expected to publish the proposals for the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, which will be discussed and possibly – or maybe, partly – agreed during the 20-21 March 2014 European Council. This is the first comprehensive review of the 2007-09 Climate and Energy Package, which resulted in the so-called ‘20-20-20’ targets by 2020. The principal intention is to define the EU’s climate change and energy policy framework for the next decade and beyond to give investors an adequate amount of predictability if not certainty. This Commentary argues, however, that the ‘2030 Framework’ is not just about predictability; it is also about making the proper adjustments based on the lessons learned and also in response to new issues that have emerged in the interim. The authors ask what the main lessons are and how they should influence the 2030 Framework. Or put differently, what are the conditions that the “2030 Framework” will need to meet in order to offer a viable package for discussion?

Building European Defence: An Architect and a Bank. Security Policy Brief No. 56, May 2014

If a set of investors plan a grand apartment building in which they can each afford just one apartment, they need an architect to design a building that is both affordable and that meets all their needs, to negotiate with the constructor, and to ensure follow-up. When building capabilities for European defence, the sole possible architect is the European Defence Agency (EDA). Those who have to reach consensus and invest are the EU Member States. And there is even a European Investment Bank (EIB) to assist them.

Bail-in Provisions in State Aid and Resolution Procedures: Are they consistent with systemic stability? CEPS Policy Brief No. 318, 21 May 2014

This CEPS Policy Brief examines the provisions for bail-in in the European Union – that is, the principle whereby any public measure to recapitalise a bank with insufficient prudential capital must be preceded by a write-down or conversion into equity of creditors’ claims – in state aid policies and in the new resolution framework for failing banks, with two aims: i) to assess whether and how they are coordinated and ii) more importantly, whether they address satisfactorily the question of systemic stability that may arise when investors fear that creditors’ claims are likely to be bailed-in in a bank crisis. The issue is especially relevant in the present context, as the comprehensive assessment exercise underway for EU banks falling under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank may lead supervisors to require substantial capital injections simultaneously for many of the banks involved, possibly shaking investors’ confidence across EU banking markets. The authors conclude that the two sets of rules are, broadly speaking, mutually consistent and that they already contain sufficient safeguards to address systemic stability concerns. However, the balance of the elements underpinning the European Commission’s decisions in individual cases may not be clear to bank creditors and potential investors in financial markets. The impression of unneeded rigidity on this very sensitive issue has been heightened by official statements over-emphasising that each case will be assessed individually under competition rules, thus feeding the concern that the systemic dimension of the issue may have been underestimated. Therefore, further clarification by the Commission may be needed on how the various criteria will be applied during the ongoing transition to banking union – perhaps through a new communication completing the state aid framework for banks in view of the adoption of the new resolution rules.

ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? CEPS Working Document No. 397, June 2014

Paul De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis states that member countries of a monetary union such as the eurozone are highly vulnerable to a self-fulfilling mechanism by which the efforts of investors to avoid losses from default can end up triggering the very default they fear. The authors test this hypothesis by applying an eclectic methodology to a time window around Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” (to keep the eurozone on firm footing) pledge on 26 July 2012. This pledge was soon followed by the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme (the prospective and conditional purchase by the European Central Bank of sovereign bonds of eurozone countries having difficulty issuing debt). The principal components of eurozone credit default swap spreads validate this choice of time frame. An event study reveals significant pre announcement contagion emanating from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria. Furthermore, time-series regression confirms frequent clusters of large shocks affecting the credit default swap spreads of the four eurozone countries but solely during the pre-announcement period. The findings of this report support the fragility hypothesis for the eurozone and endorse the Outright Monetary Transactions programme.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

ISDS and TTIP – A miracle cure for a systemic challenge? EPC Policy Brief, 14 July 2014

The European Commission decided to carry out a public consultation, which closed on 13 July, on the possible inclusion of investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This decision came in a context of polarised public debate around this procedural mechanism which enables investors to bring a case against a country that hosts their investments. Even though the main question is whether or not to include ISDS in TTIP, the Commission eyes the public consultation as a way to correct the inconsistencies of the mechanism by modernising it. However, the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP will not be a miracle cure because ISDS is a complex multilayered systemic challenge which requires a multilateral solution. In this Policy Brief, Romain Pardo explores which challenges are posed by ISDS and the extent at which TTIP’s contribution can tackle these challenges.