8 resultados para International Private Law
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
From an examination of the instruments of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and related policy measures regarding border surveillance and migration management, two interrelated issues stand out as particularly sensitive: Access to asylum and responsibility for refugee protection. The prevailing view, supported by UNHCR and others, is that responsibility for the care of asylum seekers and the determination of their claims falls on the state within whose jurisdiction the claim is made. However, the possibility to shift that responsibility to another state through inter-state cooperation or unilateral mechanisms undertaken territorially as well as abroad has been a matter of great interest to EU Member States and institutions. Initiatives adopted so far challenge the prevailing view and have the potential to undermine compliance with international refugee and human rights law. This note reviews EU action in the field by reference to the relevant legal standards and best practices developed by UNHCR, focusing on the specific problems of climate refugees and access to international protection, evaluating the inconsistencies between the internal and external dimension of asylum policy. Some recommendations for the European Parliament are formulated at the end, including on action in relation to readmission agreements, Frontex engagement rules in maritime operations, Regional Protection Programmes, and resettlement.
Resumo:
In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI.
Resumo:
Introduction. The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative output of international institutional arrangements.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. Little attention is paid, until now, to the duration of environmental procedures under Articles 226 and 228 EC Treaty, though these procedures are the only instrument at the disposal of the European Commission to enforce the application of EC environmental law1. Indeed, the Commission itself has no possibility to impose a fine or a penalty payment against a Member State, or to withhold sums under the Structural Funds, where a Member State persistently infringes Community environmental law. Rather, the Commission is obliged to first issue a Letter of Formal Notice against a Member State which infringes Community law. Where the infringement is not repaired, the Commission may issue a Reasoned Opinion against the Member State, and if also this does not lead to the compliance with EC law, it may appeal to the Court of Justice2.
Resumo:
Motivated by the dual aims of strengthening the Middle East Peace Process and contributing to Palestinian state-building, the European Union and its member states have been the biggest donors of financial assistance to the Palestinians. This CEPS Policy Brief finds, however, that these efforts have not achieved the desired change, as the EU failed to develop a coherent strategy to address Israel’s violations of international humanitarian law and it has accepted practices that undermine its political objectives. Hence, the author, Brigitte Herremans, argues that the aid has not contributed to a strong Palestinian government that can contribute to the security of both Palestinian and Israeli civilians. She calls upon the EU and its member states to take more measures to ensure that aid is received by people in need and that illegal practices on the part of Israel do not hamper its effectiveness.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.
Resumo:
The disclosure of leniency materials held by competition authorities has recently been under the spot. On the one hand, these documents could greatly help cartel victims to prove the damage and the causation link when filing damage actions against cartelists. On the other hand, future cartelists could be deterred from applying for leniency since damage actions could be brought as a result of the information submitted by themselves. Neither the current legislation nor the case law have attained yet to sufficiently clarify how to deal with this clash of interests. Our approach obviously attempts to strike a balance between both interests. But not only that. We see the current debate as a great opportunity to boost the private enforcement of antitrust law through the positive spillovers of leniency programmes. We hence propose to build a bridge between the public and the private enforcement by enabling a partial disclosure of the documents.