Who will monitor the spies? CEPS Commentary, 8 January 2014

A majority of national governments across the EU have long tried to cordon off their practices of mass interception of communications data and cyber-hacking of foreign companies and diplomats from supranational scrutiny by the EU institutions and courts, arguing that they remain within the remit of their ‘exclusive competence’ on grounds of national security. In light of the revelations that some EU member states (namely the UK, France, Germany and Sweden) are running their own secret interception programmes, however, the question of whether the EU can and should intervene becomes more pressing. This commentary, by a team of JHA specialists at CEPS, offers four important legal reasons why the covert surveillance programmes of member states should not be regarded as falling outside the scope of EU intervention.

Legal privilege for in-house lawyers in the light of AKZO: a matter of law or policy? Research Papers in Law, 05/2011

From introduction. This paper discusses the arguments in favour of extending legal privilege to in-house lawyers in the light of the CJEU‟s judgement in AKZO. The previous jurisprudence is unambiguous, as the Court clearly stated in AM & S that the confidentiality of written communications between an undertaking and its lawyer is protected under Union law only when two cumulative conditions are fulfilled: they must be connected to the exercise of the client‟s rights of defence and the lawyer must be independent, that is, “not bound to the client by a relationship of employment”.1 This protection also applies to internal notes confined to reporting the content of communications with independent lawyers containing legal advice.2