Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: the challenge of integration and unity. CEPS Special Report No. 75/December 2012

In the lead-up to the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan represent two elements of the most ambitious regional integration project launched in the post-Soviet era since 1991. This CEPS Special Report examines both the potential and the limits of Eurasian economic integration. For the purpose of assessing the Eurasian integration process, CEPS applied a modified version of a framework first developed by Ernest B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter in 1964 to project whether economic integration of a group of countries automatically engenders political unity. Taking the data available for the early stages of the European integration process as a benchmark, the results for the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space point to a rather unfavourable outlook for Eurasian economic integration.

Eurasian integration. Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. OSW Study 44/2013

In 2009, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian prime minister, gave impetus to the establishment of closer relations within what was then a still narrow group of three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Russia was determined in embarking on the implementation of the principles of the Customs Union among these three states and, since 2012, within the Common Economic Space as well. This process of integration is intended to bring about the introduction of ‘four freedoms’ in this area: the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. From Moscow’s point of view, building up such integration structures is especially necessary in order to counteract the economic expansion of the European Union and China. It also feels it is important to take measures against the loosening of the bonds between the CIS countries and Russia. At the same time, close co-operation is expected to guarantee for Russia that the strong politico-economic influences in this area will be maintained. Despite the numerous limitations of the integration process, such as the small number of the participating states or limited progress in implementing the CES, this is still the most advanced integration programme in the region seen since the collapse of the USSR. Progress in putting the rules of the Customs Union into practice can be seen as a success for Moscow. In turn, the formation of the CES is still at an early stage, and it is difficult to determine at this point to what extent the three countries will harmonise their markets.

The Western Balkans: deadlock in the EU enlargement process. OSW Commentary No. 43, 2010-11-24

On 9 November the European Commission presented the annual reports assessing the progress of the Balkans states in their preparations for EU membership, the enlargement strategy up to autumn 2011, and the assessment of the EU membership applications submitted by Albania and Macedonia. All these documents show that the reform process in the Balkan states has slowed down in comparison to previous years. The main reason for this slowdown is the negative consequences of the global economic crisis for these countries. Nonetheless, the transformation process is continuing, despite these difficulties. Another increasingly serious challenge for integrating the Balkan states is the EU's growing reluctance to enlarge any further. Among other measures, the EU states have blocked the formal acknowledgement of the integration progress (objections have been raised to the submission of membership applications by Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and to granting Albania candidate status), which has significantly prolonged the accession process. In fact, this illustrates the lack of political will to accept new members. The European Commission is aware that the integration process may be blocked, and so in the coming year it is planning to focus on fostering the idea of enlargement among the EU member states. It will also focus on persuading the Balkan states to move on with reforms, especially those designed to strengthen state institutions (administration, the judiciary), even if their progress will not be formally considered during the integration process. The Commission assumes that by the end of next year, the reforms implemented by the Balkan states will be comprehensive enough to persuade the EU states to step up the integration process in subsequent years. However, if the EU member states' standpoint on the enlargement process does not change, the Commission's efforts will not bring about the expected results. Considering that their prospects for EU membership are receding, the Balkan states may not have sufficient motivation to go on with long-term reform efforts. As a result, the transformation process may become impeded, and in the longer perspective, the situation in the entire region may be destabilised.

Belarus-Russia: Whither Integration? OSW Point of View (unspecified), May 2003

Of the re-integration processes currently taking place in the former Soviet Union, the formation of a Russian-Belarusian so-called 'Union State' is one of the most advanced. A customs union was formally announced between the two countries as early as 1995 and the process of constructing the Union State itself was launched in December 1999. However, both events were largely driven by the perceived need to match societal demands, without much concrete action and the Union State remained largely 'virtual'. Only in the last few years has the Russian initiative allowed for moving from symbolic gestures to political action and since late 2002 debate and policy have intensified on specific issues of economic and political co-operation. However, despite such advances in the integration process, its objectives remain vague and there is little or no agreement on the principles that should govern the process. Furthermore, current bilateral relations questions still dominate the dialogue. The project seems at present to be driven mainly by the political interests of both countries' presidents and also, to a lesser extent, by the interests of business, political, military and security elites, each apparently motivated by self- and group-interest in the emerging dialogue of integration. In contrast to EU integration, the societies of the two countries involved appear to have had little or no say in the process. Thus, several questions naturally arise. What is the real nature of such integration? What motivates the parties involved? What stage has the process reached? What likely future course will it take? What might be the consequences of it for Belarusian independence? Answers to these questions should ultimately determine the stance and policies of the enlarged EU in this area.

Innovations of the European Central Bank in the Context of Financial and Monetary Integration: A Chinese Assessment. ZEI Discussion Paper C229, 2015

In the 15 years since the introduction of the Euro, the integration process within the European Economic and Monetary Union has seen rapid development in terms of both breadth and depth. Exclusively responsible for the monetary policy of the Eurozone, the European Central Bank has continued to adjust to meet the challenges brought about by these changes. The paper explores financial and monetary integration in the Eurozone and reviews the reasons, specific performance and impact of changes in the European Central Bank’s decision-making mechanisms. The purpose of which is to deepen and expand understanding in academic circles of the European economy and the European Economic and Monetary Union, as well as their development trends.

EU Conditionality on Nationality-Sensitive Matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Promoting Democracy or Maintaining the Status Quo? EDAP 05/2013

This paper will analyse the impact of the EU conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and its efficacy in promoting democratic changes in this country. It will be argued that as BiH is a unique case, its constitutional constraints must be taken into account because every reform that affects the difficult balance between the three main ethno-religious groups of BiH is perceived as a nationality-sensitive issue and is therefore vulnerable to political pressure. With reference to two specific situations where EU has demanded the BiH political elites to adopt EU-compatible reforms, namely the police reform process and the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci ruling, it will be argued that the use of the conditionality tool has increased inter-ethnic polarization among the political parties, thus preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina from moving forward in the EU integration process.

Lisbon Fado: The European Union under Reform

From the Introduction. To address the uncertainties surrounding the Treaty of Lisbon, this book examines several issues from various angles. Regardless of the results of the second referendum in Ireland and the pending ratifications in Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany, the European Union (EU) will not be the same after the Lisbon Treaty. If it comes into effect, Europeans will enter into a new stage in the deepening of the integration process; if it is rejected, the first decade of the 21st Century will represent a period of institutional stagnation in Europe’s integration. Nonetheless, the chapters in this book share the consensus that, despite its limitations, the Lisbon Treaty will make the EU decision making process more efficient, enhance regional democracy and strengthen its international voice.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

Toward international peace and security: Addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation in a globalized world. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

With a growing number of threats to governance in the international system that result from globalization and technological innovation, it is no surprise that states have come to rely more heavily on each other and the global community for support. While the EU is partially constrained by the ultimate outcome of its own integration process, limited knowledge on this issue, and the national interests of its Member States, other governments are also experiencing difficulty in domestic implementation of international resolutions. To better understand the impact of the most recent sanctioning efforts, this paper will explore the development of the non-proliferation regime, examine implementation mechanisms of non-proliferation agreements, and analyze the impact of increased cooperation among states to thwart the spread of WMD technology and material. Case studies of unilateral measures undertaken by the US and EU against Iran will provide insight into the political and economic implications of economic sanctions from individual governments. New and emerging methods for limiting rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring the means to develop WMD will also be discussed in an effort to further discussion for future policy debates on this critical topic.

Dealing with the Fallout: West Germany's Response to the Solange Decision (1974). ACES Working Papers, 2011

The European Union's powerful legal system has proven to be the vanguard moment in the process of European integration. As early as the 1960s, the European Court of Justice established an effective and powerful supranational legal order, beyond the original wording of the Treaties of Rome through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Whereas scholars have analyzed the evolution of EU case law and its implications, only very recent historical scholarship has examined how the Member States received this process in the context of a number of difficult political and economic crises for the integration process. This paper investigates how the national level dealt with these fundamental transformations in the European legal system. Specifically, it examines one of the Union's most important member states, the Federal Republic of Germany. Faced with a huge number of cases dealing with European law, German judges dealt with the supremacy of European law very cautiously, negotiating between increasingly polarized academic, public and ministerial debates on the question throughout the 1960s. By the mid 1970s, the German Constitutional Court famously limited the power of the ECJ in its Solange decision (1974). This was an expression of a broader discourse in Germany from 1968 onwards about the qualitative nature of democracy and participation in public life and was in some aspects a marker, at which the German elites felt comfortable expressing the value of their national constitutional system on the European stage. This paper examines the political, media and academic build up and response to the Constitutional Court's decision in the 1970s, arguing that the national "reception" is central to understanding the dynamics and evolution of European Union legal history.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

Gibt es eine politische Philosophie der Europäischen Union? = Is there a political philosophy of the European Union?. ZEI Discussion Paper C223, 2014

In a theoretical context, the European Union is generally interpreted through the prism of integration theories, which in turn reflect the ever changing empirical reality of the integration process. ZEI Director Ludger Kühnhardt asks if and to what extent the process of European integration has begun to generate a specific political philosophy which uses the EU - and not the classical notion of the state – as the starting and reference point for its reasoning. Kühnhardt examines examples – such as the European notion of civil rights and the notion of the Union itself, but also critical categories such as euroskepticism – which indicate that the EU itself is beginning to be the starting point and frame of reference for a reflection on the common good. For now, a political philosophy in the context of the European Union exists only in an embryonic stage, but the topic may generate intellectual insights through further and deeper research.

Can the eurozone’s economic governance combine political accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness? EPC Discussion Paper, 1 September 2015

After years of economic crisis, resulting in significant changes to economic governance at EU level, especially for the eurozone, the time has come to consider the longer term political and economic implications of this new situation for the economic integration process. Not only to determine how well the system is likely to function but also what more needs to be done to ensure long-term stability and to provide the EU institutions with sufficient political legitimacy to carry out this new role. This article does not consider abolishing the euro, based on the conviction that introducing the euro created a path dependency that makes trying to unpick the seams of the process extremely costly. While, economically, the exit of one eurozone member state might conceivably be manageable (but costly, especially for that country), the long term political costs might end up unravelling the whole European integration process, with the potential for a bankrupt and politically unstable state outside the euro but still within the EU. However, the status quo situation is still unstable, politically and economically, and needs further policy reforms.

Light and shadows in Europe’s new Action Plan for Capital Markets Union. ECMI Commentary No. 40/5 October 2015

The European Commission’s Action Plan consists, in a nutshell, of a short list of technical proposals and a longer one of (rather general) potential actions. Overall, the plan indeed proposes to achieve some short-term objectives, such as a reduction of listing costs for SMEs, but it lacks long-term vision. The plan bundles actions under rather generic objectives of long-term finance or cross-border investing. Improving the informational infrastructure (e.g. accounting standards, company data) and cross-border enforcement of rules is left to vaguely defined future actions, but these constitute the core of the capital markets infrastructure. Without a well-defined set of measurable objectives, the whole plan may lose political momentum and become an opportunity for interested parties to cherry pick their pet provisions. Building a single market, i.e. removing cross-border obstacles to capital circulation, is too challenging a task to simply appear as one of many items on a long list of general objectives, which incidentally do not include institutional reform. The ultimate risk is that the Commission may just miss a unique opportunity to revamp and improve the financial integration process in Europe after almost a decade of harmful financial retrenchment.

Challenges for the European Union in times of crisis: reactions

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, this entity faced a lot of challenges that could had been stopped the European dream without the fast, prompt and appropriate reaction of the decision makers. There were a lot of difficult times in its history of more than 60 years but the ambition and need of going forward on the way of integration prevailed and today we can talk about European Union as one of the most important global players, having one of the most complex and fascinating political systems. The tenacity and the willing to succeed off the decision makers made this possible. Moments like “The Empty Chair Crisis“, changes with regards to the decision- making process, convenient for ones but inconvenient for the others, lack of consensus with regards to the new accessions, the big changes that Europe went through in the late 80s etc. showed that the decision makers can have an appropriate response whatever the problem would be and that we must stay together and go on dreaming to a united nation in the form of a federation. Nowadays we are facing maybe the most difficult moment in European Union history. Many of the member states were and still are on the edge. A lot of immediate and prompt actions were taken since the start of financial crisis, either political or economic, drove by the need of going on. We are too much into the integration process, too much dependent one of each other so that we cannot stop and simply go back only to the concept of national state.