The Institutional Framework of the Labour Market. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 25, February 2012

Following the identification of relevant labour market characteristics in Deliverable 9.1 (Factor Markets Working Paper No. 25), a survey was designed and implemented across the participant countries in the Factor Markets project. These survey results are detailed in this paper, Deliverable 9.3. The focus is of the survey, which was completed with the assistance of project partner teams, included, employment market, labour legislation, wage-setting mechanisms, unions, taxation and social benefits, education and training, labour mobility and general features of agriculture. Based on the questions posed and the responses received in the survey, in broad terms the agricultural labour market characteristics in the countries under study are not as heterogeneous as one might anticipate. Some of the differences, such as minimum rates of pay, are common to sectors other than agriculture also. There is a notable lack of a regional pattern to the labour market characteristics, i.e. no strong evidence of a north/south or east/west divide. Moreover, the labour market characteristics of one country are not necessarily a good indicator of the labour market characteristics of neighbouring countries.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.