Closing financial institutions on both sides of the Atlantic: Are there differences in approach? CEPS Commentary, 25 February 2015

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis both the EU and the US have implemented resolution procedures for their largest and most systemic financial institutions. This Commentary examines the main differences between the two frameworks. The EU framework allows, inter alia, action to prevent the failure of a credit institution, while the US regulatory framework requires that all systemic banks subject to resolution must be closed and resolved. The greater flexibility under the EU resolution framework allows action to be taken to preserve a credit institution without putting it through an insolvency process, which makes limiting moral hazard less obvious. Moreover, the scope of the EU framework is still narrow, since it does not allow the recovery of non-bank financial institutions, whereas the US framework does.

Do we need a resolution fund paid for by financial institutions? EuropEos Commentary No. 2, 17 May 2010

In this EuropEos Commentary, Stefano Micossi reviews recent efforts to build a stronger and more coherent regulatory system for financial markets and finds the idea of a resolution fund at best a distraction, and at worst a harbinger of renewed financial instability.

Determinants of Financial Development across the Mediterranean. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 29/February 2013

Casual observation shows that that the financial systems in the southern and eastern Mediterranean are unable (or unwilling) to divert the financial resources that are available to them as funding opportunities to private enterprises. Using a sample of both northern and southern Mediterranean countries for the years 1985 to 2009, this study empirically assesses the reasons underlying such conditions. The results show that strong legal institutions, good democratic governance and adequate implementation of financial reforms can have a substantial positive impact on financial development only when they are present collectively. Moreover, inflation appears to undermine banking development, but less so when the capital account is open. Government debt growth appears to weaken credit growth, which confirms that public debt ‘crowds out’ private debt. Lastly, capital inflows appear to primarily have an income effect, increasing income and thereby national savings, and thus increasing the availability of credit.