The UK-Canada Agreement on mutual support of missions abroad: loyalty compromised? CEPS Commentary, 18 October 2012

The UK and Canada recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at allowing the two countries to optimise their respective diplomatic resources by sharing embassy and consulate sites, the joint acquisition, supply and use of services, as well as collaboration on crisis response, consular services, security, diplomatic mail, information management and IT. This CEPS Commentary argues that the MoU on Mutual Support of Missions Abroad runs counter to the spirit of loyal cooperation, in particular in the realm of EU foreign policy. It also raises challenges to coherence, consistency and effectiveness of EU action in policy areas concerning visas, trade and consular protection. Moreover, the agreement may throw a spanner in the works of EU solidarity and the creation of a stronger EU identity, both internally and externally

Europe's growth problem (and what to do about it). Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/03, April 2013

The issue: The European Union's pre-crisis growth performance was disappointing enough, but the performance has been even more dismal since the onset of the crisis. Weak growth is undermining private and public deleveraging,and is fuelling continued banking fragility. Persistently high unemployment is eroding skills, discouraging labour market participation and undermining the EU’s long-term growth potential. Low overall growth is making it much tougher for the hard-hit economies in southern Europe to recover competitiveness and regain control of their public finances. Stagnation would reduce the attractiveness of Europe for investment. Under these conditions, Europe's social models are bound to prove unsustainable. Policy Challenge: The European Union's weak long-term growth potential and unsatisfactory recovery from the crisis represent a major policy challenge. Over and above the structural reform agenda, which vitally important, bold policy action is needed. The priority is to get bank credit going. Banking problems need to be assessed properly and bank resolution and recapitalisation should be pursued. Second, fostering the reallocation of factors to the most productive firms and the sectors that contribute to aggregate rebalancing is vital. Addressing intra-euro area competitiveness divergence is essential to support growth in southern Europe. Third, the speed of fiscal adjustment needs to be appropriate and EU funds should be front loaded to countries in deep recession, while the European Investment Bank should increase investment.

An end to support for renewables? The wrong battle to fight. CEPS Commentary, October 2013

On 11 October 2013, the CEOs of 10 large European energy utilities issued a warning that the European energy infrastructure is “in jeopardy” and called for an end to support for renewables on grounds that wind and solar were mature technologies that no longer required such support. Given the unlikelihood, however, that EU decision-makers would renege on their decarbonisation or renewable energy targets, Fabio Genoese asks in this commentary whether it would not be a better strategy for conventional generators to explore new business models built around a ‘reliability pricing system’, in which nearly 100% reliability would be guaranteed for base load but not for peak demand.

Influence of Agricultural Support on Sale Prices of French Farmland: A comparison of different subsidies, accounting for the role of environmental and land regulations. Factor Markets Working Document No. 51, June 2013

This paper investigates the determinants of agricultural land price in several regions in France over the period 1994-2011, using individual plot transaction data, with a particular emphasis on agricultural subsidies and nitrate zoning regulations. It found a positive but relatively small capitalisation effect of the total subsidies per hectare. The data revealed that agricultural subsidies capitalised, at least to some extent, but the magnitude of such a capitalisation depends on the region considered, on the type of subsidy considered, and on the location of the plot in a nitrate surplus zone or not. Only land set-aside premiums significantly capitalise into land price, while single farm payments have a significant positive capitalisation impact only for plots located in a nitrate-surplus zone.

Tunisia. Supervising Tunisian Elections by civil society: How to improve it? Arab Citizenship Review No. 7. January 2015

Introduction. On October 26, 2014, Tunisia held its second democratic legislative elections. Participation among more than 5 million registered voters was at about 60%, a relatively good turnout for the country, compared to the 52% voters in 2011. Preliminary results for the 33 constituencies (27 within the country and 6 for expatriates) reveal that secular frontrunner Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) won around 37% percent of votes while moderate Islamist party Ennahdha, winner of the 2011 elections and leader of Tunisia’s post-revolution government, received 27% of votes. Other parties with notable percentages are the Free Patriotic Union (French: UPL) with 4.4% and the leftist party, Popular Front, with 3.7%. Legislative were immediately followed by two round presidential elections the first one held on November 23, the second one after one month. Conversely to what was expected, people were more attracted by presidential elections even though president has notably less prerogatives than the parliament: representing the state, he is mainly responsible for determining the general state policies in the domains of defense, foreign relations and national security (article 76.) This paradox is ascribed to national imaginary more confident in a “Zaïm” (leader) rather than a collective institution such as a parliament. The turnout was at about 64% within the national 27 constituencies. Out of 70 candidates (including 5 female), 27 (with only one female) met the legal requirements to run for the presidency. The result confirms the legislative trend and Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of Nidaa, was proclaimed the third President of Tunisia. He gained 39.46% of the votes at the first round elections. Essebsi was followed by Moncef Marzouki who received an unexpected score (33.43%) at the first round, thanks to the support of Ennahdha audience and to an active and insistent campaign focused on the idea that revolution is threatened by old regime guard “come-back.” Rewarded for his long militant live, the extreme leftist Hamma Hammami in a new look gained 7,8% of the votes while the new comer Slim Riahi received 5,5% despite rumors circulating on his personal reputation. Notably, Kalthoum Kennou gained 0,55% (18.287 votes) but listed eleventh out of 27.

German macro: how it's different and why that matters. EPC Discussion Paper, May 2016

Do the macroeconomics of the German political establishment really differ from standard western macroeconomics? That question was the starting point for the seminar on ‘German macro: How it’s Different and Why that Matters’, which was held at Heriot-Watt University in December 2015, with financial support from the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) and the Money, Macro & Finance Research Group (MMF). This ebook, edited by George Bratsiotis and David Cobham, is the result of that exercise; six of the papers were presented at the seminar in earlier versions, and the editors sought some additional papers to complete the range of perspectives offered. The authors all sought out to discover whether or not there is something unique about German macroeconomics, and in what ways it differs from standard western macroeconomics; is it true that the former neglects demand management (although it may be quite interventionist in other ways), rejects debt relief and emphasises structural reform designed to improve competitiveness as the (only) key to economic growth? How much of whatever difference exists is due to a well worked out set of ideas in the form of Ordoliberalism? In what way does it relate to Germany’s own experiences in different periods? And how far is this the result of political preferences and how much do the idiosyncrasies of these German views matter, for the development of the Eurozone and indeed the health of the German economy?