The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

Why is the Greek economy collapsing? A simple tale of high multipliers and low exports. CEPS Commentary, 21 December 2012

In an attempt to understand why the Greek economy is collapsing, this Commentary points out two key aspects that are often overlooked – the country’s large multiplier and a bad export performance. When combined with the need for a large fiscal adjustment, these factors help explain how fiscal consolidation in Greece has been associated with such a large drop in GDP.

Defying the Oracle? The 2014 Greek Presidency of the EU Council. EPIN Working Paper No. 36, February 2014

The Greek government would like to promote the idea that the country is an equal partner in the EU system of governance, despite the country's economic, political, and social implosion. This presidency is characterised by poor leadership and a lack of vision. It is being called upon to coordinate a presidential agenda without being substantially involved in its drafting; it simply mediates between European institutions. This trend has a negative impact on the behaviour and trust of public administrators, whose personal investment is vital for the smooth functioning of the presidency. The paper concludes that Greece’s presidency of the Council of the EU cannot be the standard-bearer for a pro-European message.