Eurozone as home country of banks. CEPS Commentary, 2 July 2012

The euro area summit has managed to surprise the markets once again. By moving banking supervision of the eurozone to the European Central Bank, a huge step towards a more federal banking model has been taken, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. But will this move be enough to re-establish confidence, bolster the euro interbank market and further financial integration?

Annexe II: Analyse de la situation politique en Mediterranee et dans les pays du golfe el les risques sur les approvisionnements petroliers et gaziers 1) Algerie & Pays D'Afrique du Nord 2) Pays de L'Est Mediterraneen et du Golfe. OME, Draft du 18 April 1995 = Annex II: Analysis of the political situation in the Mediterranean and the Gulf countries and risks on petroleum and gas supplies 1) Pays D'Algerie & North Africa 2) Country of Eastern Mediterraneen and the Gulf. OME, Draft of 18 April 1995

None.

US bilateral regional agreements: The negative welfare effects of multiplicity in country of origin rules - A new methodology. ACES Working Papers No. 2, 2008

The intent of this paper is to present a formal methodology for estimating rules of origin requirements. Section II of the paper presents the concept of the ROO. Earlier attempts to capture the costs of ROO are presented in Section III. Our suggested methodology relying on the tariff equivalents literature is presented in Section IV.

Who calls the shots in the committees of the new European Parliament? CEPS Special Report No. 97, 21 November 2014

This CEPS Special Report analyses the composition of the 20 committees in the new European Parliament and how representative they are of the 28 member states, identifying which policy areas or committees are of particular interest to MEPs from certain countries. It also examines the allocation of committee chairs and party coordinator positions to assess whether the country of origin matters and if so, why. The study reveals that in general the countries��� share of representatives in the committees is very similar in most of the cases to their representation in Parliament. Still, some policy areas have a special relevance for some countries and attract their MEPs in larger numbers. Due to the procedure used in the allocation of the committee chairs, which favours the largest political groups and the largest national parties within them, MEPs from larger member states tend to hold most of these coveted positions. The internal process followed by the political groups in appointing their coordinators in the respective committees is predisposed towards MEPs with seniority, experience and good connections. All in all, the strategic relevance that national parties attach to these positions makes a difference.

Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine's internal diversity. OSW Point of View Number 40, March 2014

Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country���s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ���sub-Ukraines��� has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country���s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine ��� separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula.

The EU, China and Southeast Asia: Divergent Views of Dealing with Human Security. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 8, May 2014

Introduction. This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)���s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar���a source country of numerous such challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ���ASEAN way���.2 The EU, as a strong proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates about the ���ASEAN way���s��� longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics that seem to indicate that the ���ASEAN way,��� at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.

Regulation on ���cross-border portability��� of online content services: Roaming for Netflix or the end of copyright territoriality? CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2016

In a communication to the Parliament and the Council entitled ���Towards a modern, more European copyright framework��� and dated 9 December 2015,1 the European Commission confirmed its intention to progressively remove the main obstacles to the functioning of the Digital Single Market for copyrighted works. The first step of this long-term plan, which was first announced in Juncker���s Political Guidelines2 and the Communication on ���A Digital Single Market strategy for Europe���,3 is a proposal for a regulation aimed at ensuring the so-called ���cross-border portability��� of online services giving access to content such as music, games, films and sporting events.4 In a nutshell, the proposed regulation seeks to enable consumers with legal access to such online content services in their country of residence to use the same services also when they are in another member state for a limited period of time. On the one hand, this legislative proposal has the full potential to resolve the (limited) issue of portability, which stems from the national dimension of copyright and the persisting territorial licensing and distribution of copyright content.5 On the other hand, as this commentary shows, the ambiguity of certain important provisions in the proposed regulation might affect its scope and effectiveness and contribute to the erosion of the principle of copyright territoriality.

One year of Ukraine���s De-communisation. A change in the historical narrative. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 211/16.05.2016

A year ago, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted four bills on the policy of national memory: on granting access to the archives of the repressive organs of the Communist totalitarian regime in the years 1917���1991, on the legal status and commemoration of Ukrainian independence fighters in the twentieth century, on the immortalisation of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War, 1939���1945, and on the condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and the forbidding of their symbolism from being promoted. The laws came into force on 21 May 2015. After a year, it can be stated that only the latter two are being observed ��� the official narrative regarding World War II has been changed, mainly due to the activity of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR), but also as a result of public statements by President Petro Poroshenko. The process of removing from public places the names and commemorations referring to the Soviet era is underway, and the fears that this may trigger serious conflicts have not proved true. From roughly a thousand placenames subject to de-communisation some two thirds have been changed so far (parliamentary bills regarding the remaining ones are awaiting approval) and most statues of Communist leaders have been removed. However, the law concerning independence fighters, which raised the most serious controversies, did not have any practical consequences. Moreover, nothing suggests that this could change. The implementation of the de-communisation laws is associated with a significant change in Ukrainian patriotic narrative: it is no longer focused on national martyrdom and it is beginning to emphasize heroic motives, which is in line with wartime needs. The fact that some of these motives are likely to trigger problems in Ukraine���s relations with Poland seems to be viewed as a marginal ���by-product���.