Do Institutional Changes Make a Difference? A veto player analysis of how institutional changes in the Council of the EU influence legislative efficiency and outputs. Brugges Political Research Paper No. 31, October 2013

A driving argument behind recent EU treaty reforms was that more qualified majority voting (QMV) was required to reduce the potential dangers of legislative paralysis caused by enlargement. Whilst existing literature on enlargement mostly focuses on the question of what changed in the legislative process after the 2004 enlargement, the question of why these changes occurred has been given far less attention. Through the use of a single veto player theoretical model, this paper seeks to test and explain whether enlargement reduces the efficiency of the legislative process and alters the type of legislation produced, and whether QMV can compensate for these effects. In doing this, it offers a theoretical explanation as to why institutional changes that alter the level of cohesion between actors in the Council have an influence over both the legislative process and its outcomes.

EU Trade Actors after Lisbon: Enhanced Negotiations or Business as Usual? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 32, November 2013

As seen by the launching of trade negotiations with Japan and the United States, the European Union has shifted gears in order to achieve amplified benefits in bilateral trade agreements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought the European Parliament and the European External Action Service into the picture as new actors in trade negotiations. The question arises if the new framework of trade negotiations is better off than the pre-Lisbon era. By applying Veto Players theory to the Central American Association Agreement and Principal-Agent theory to the Ukrainian Association Agreement, two results were concluded. First, the participation of the European Parliament as a veto player has decreased the effectiveness of trade negotiation. Second, the participation of the European External Action Service has shown the contrary, namely an increase of effectiveness in trade negotiations.

Public Procurement Law and Health care: From Theory to Practice. Research Paper in Law, 2/2010

From the Introduction. This contribution will focus on the core question if, how and to what extent the EU procurement rules and principles (may) affect the national health care systems. We start our analysis by summarizing the applicable EU public procurement legislation, principles and soft law and its exact scope in relation to health care. (section 2). Subsequently, we turn to the parties in a contract, subject to procurement rules in the field of health care, addressing both the definition of contracting authorities and relevant case law (section 3). This will then lead to an analysis of possible justifications for not holding a tender procedure in the field of health care (section 4). Finally, we illustrate the impact of EU public procurement rules on health care by analysing a Dutch case study, in which the question whether public hospitals in the Netherlands qualify as contracting authorities in terms of the Public Sector Directive stood central (section 5). Our conclusions will follow in section 6.

Society – the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 17.02.2014

This study is first in a series of policy briefs on Europe and its neighbours in the east and south. In this series we will publish papers commissioned or produced by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in the framework of its work in this field. This policy brief is the product of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s cooperation with the Warsaw-based Institute of Public Affairs. The text was completed on 17 of February 2014.