Special Education and the Risk of Becoming Less Educated in Germany and the United States. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.1, 13 December, 2004

Over the twentieth century, a growing group of students has been transferred into considerably expanded special education systems. These programs serve children with diagnosed impairments and disabilities and students with a variety of learning difficulties. Children and youth “with special educational needs” constitute a heterogeneous group with social, ethnic, linguistic, and physical disadvantages. An increasingly large percentage of those students at risk of leaving school without credentials participate in special education, a highly legitimated low status (and stigmatizing) school form. While most countries commit themselves to school integration or inclusive education to replace segregated schools and separate classes, cross-national and regional comparisons of special education’s diverse student bodies show considerable disparities in their (1) rates of classification, (2) provided learning opportunities, and (3) educational attainments. Analyzing special education demographics and organizational structures indicates which children and youth are most likely to grow up less educated and how educational systems distribute educational success and failure. Findings from a German-American comparison show that which students bear the greatest risk of becoming less educated depends largely on definitions of “special educational needs” and the institutionalization of special education systems.

Why Are German Employers Associations Declining? A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.3, 2005

This paper challenges the conventional explanation for declining density of German employers associations. The dominant account asserts that German trade unions have taken advantage of increased globalization since the 1980s which has made internationally active enterprises more vulnerable to production disruptions to extract additional monopoly rents from multinational employers via aggressive collective bargaining. Small firms have responded to the increased union pressures by avoiding membership employers associations, which has produced the density declines. Data, however, disconfirm the conventional explanation; compensation increases have actually become increasingly smaller over the decades. This paper presents an alternative explanation that is consistent with the data. We argue that it is the large product manufacturers rather than the trade unions that have greatly increased price pressures on parts suppliers, which has led to a disproportionate number of suppliers to quit employers associations. The paper also discusses these findings in light of the "varieties of capitalism" literature. It points out that this literature has depicted national models as too homogeneous. The decision of several German employers associations to offer different classes of membership represents an accentuation of variety within national varieties of capitalism.

Germany as viewed by other Member States. EPIN Working Paper No. 33, 21 June 2012

Germany’s problem is not so much that it is generally right about the need for fiscal discipline but that it has to learn how to be right: this is the most difficult issue to manage from a political standpoint. This EPIN (European Policy Institutes Network) paper brings together contributions from a cross-section of EU member states and the Gallup World Poll survey on the question of how Germany is being viewed at this time of economic and political crisis. The conclusions, subtitled: The Narcissism of Small Differences is a refreshingly candid and insightful analysis of current European relations, noting that Germany’s current weight reflects only the conjuncture of extraordinary domestic and international economic factors. How Germany and the other member states behave towards one another now will have implications for all long after this moment has passed.

What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances. CEPS Working Document No. 368, September 2012

This paper analyzes two claims that have been made about the Target2 payment system. The first one is that this system has been used to support unsustainable current account deficits of Southern European countries. The second one is that the large accumulation of Target2 claims by the Bundesbank represents an unacceptable risk for Germany if the eurozone were to break up. We argue that these claims are unfounded. They also lead to unnecessary fears in Germany that make a solution of the eurozone crisis more difficult. Ultimately, this fear increases the risk of a break-up of the eurozone. Or to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, what Germany should fear most is simply its own fear.

Mutual perceptions of Asia and the EU/Europe. Media, elite and public opinion in Singapore and Germany. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 12, December 2012

In an increasingly interlinked and interdependent world, Europe and Asia are key players. Free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the ones the EU concluded with South Korea and Singapore, are indicative of strong mutual economic interests. It is therefore timely to take a closer look at the mutual perceptions of Asians and Europeans – not only at the governmental and policymaking levels, but also in terms of public opinion and the media. Drawing on data from an extensive research project led by the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), New Zealand, the empirical study in this paper assesses the mutual perceptions of the EU/Europe and Asia, and their respective actors, focusing on two countries – Germany and Singapore. It seeks to do so through an analysis of the data collected from print and broadcast media, interviews with media practitioners, and the findings from public opinion surveys.

Greece and the European Agenda: EU Enlargement and European Monetary Union. Program for the Study of Germany & Europe Working Paper 8.2

In the decade to come, the European Union will embark on two new projects, each destined to transform it in fundamental ways: (i) Eastern enlargement, and (ii) economic and monetary union. Neither of these projects will affect all members equally or in the same way. But Greece will, for two reasons, be affected in a manner qualitatively different to all other member states. First, Greece is the only country physically affected by the Luxembourg Summit's decision to begin accession negotiations with some, but not all, Central and Eastern European applicant countries: as a result of this decision, she will continue, for at least another eight to ten years, to be the only member country not to share a common border with another member state, with all the consequent implications in economic and geostrategic tenns. Second, when the European Council meets in early May to select those member states that are deemed to have met the convergence criteria, it will find that Greece is the only member state falling short of those criteria. This development may create additional difficulties for her economy during the transitional period of derogation. It will also pose new risks to Greece, insofar as she will be absent during the initial-and crucial-years of establishing a common monetary policy.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.

Investment behaviour of EU arable crop farms in selected EU countries and the impact of policy reforms. Factor Markets Working Document No. 42, May 2013

This deliverable provides a comparative analysis, among selected EU member states, of the investment demand of a sample of specialised field crop farms for farm buildings, machinery and equipment as determined by different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support. It allows for the existence of uncertainty in the price of output farmers receive and for both long- and short-run determinants of investment levels, as well as for the presence of irregularities in the cost adjustment function due to the existence of threshold-type behaviours. The empirical estimation reveals that three investment regimes are consistently identified in Germany and Hungary, across asset and support types, and in France for machinery and equipment. More traditional disinvestment-investment type behaviours characterise investment in farm building in France and the UK, across support types, and Italy for both asset classes under coupled payments. The long-run dynamic adjustment of capital stocks is consistently and significantly estimated to be towards a – mostly non-stationary – lower level of capitalisation of the farm analysed. By contrast, the expected largely positive short-run effects of an increase in output prices are often not significant. The effect of CAP support on both types of investment is positive, although seldom significant, while the proxy for uncertainty employed fails to be significant yet, in most cases, has the expected effect of reducing the investment levels.

Simulation Results on the Impact of Changes in the Main EU Policy Tools on Farm Investment Behaviour. Factor Markets Working Document No. 56, June 2013

This paper completes the comparative analysis of the investment demand behaviour, of a sample of specialised arable crop farms, for farm buildings and machinery and equipment, as a function of the different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support, in selected European Union Member States. This contribution focuses on their quantitative interdependence calculating the relevant elasticity measures. In turn, they constitute the methodological tool to simulate the percentage expected change in average net investment levels associated to the implementation of the, recently proposed and currently under discussion, reductions in the Pillar I Direct Payments disbursed under the Common Agricultural Policy. Evidence suggests a statistically significant elastic and inelastic relationship between both types of subsidies and the investment levels for both asset classes in Germany and Italy, respectively. An elastic dependence of investment in farm buildings on decoupled subsidies exists in Hungary while changes in the level of coupled payments appear to translate into less than proportional changes in the demand for both farm buildings and machinery and equipment in France. Coupled payments appear to influence the UK demand for both asset classes in an elastic manner while decoupled support seems to induce a similar effect on investment in machinery and equipment. Since the currently discussed Common Agricultural Policy reform options imply, almost exclusively, a reduction in the level of support granted through Direct Payments, simulated effects were expected to reveal a worsening of the farm investment prospects for both asset types (i.e., a larger negative investment or a smaller positive one). The actual evidence largely respects this expectation with the sole exception of investment in machinery and equipment in France and Italy reaching smaller negative or larger positive levels irrespectively of the magnitude of the implemented cuts in Direct Payments.

Labor Market Policy Decentralization in Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy - Dynamics and Reasons. ACES Working Papers No. 5, 2008

This article argues that welfare-to-work or activation policies, which have been adopted across a range of OECD countries during the last two decades, do not only have led to changes in the substance of the welfare state but also to transformations in its institutional configuration. This institutional transformation includes the spatial reconfiguration of the welfare state, which has given new roles to the supra-national, national, and sub-national levels of government as well as private actors in the management and creation of labor market policies. By bringing institutions into these debates, this article seeks to expand the literature on welfare-to-work and activation as to date authors working on this topic have said very little about the degree, types, and reasons for the spatial re-configuration of welfare-to-work policies across different states. To fill a gap in the literatures on changes in the welfare state and its territorial configuration in particular, we compare trends in the re-configuration of welfare-to-work policies in Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. We find that there is a cross-national trend, when it comes to the institutional effects of the implementation of activation. These trends bear a tension between decentralization and centralization, as both central and sub-national levels of government have acquired new responsibilities to implement the activation paradigm.

Dealing with the Fallout: West Germany's Response to the Solange Decision (1974). ACES Working Papers, 2011

The European Union's powerful legal system has proven to be the vanguard moment in the process of European integration. As early as the 1960s, the European Court of Justice established an effective and powerful supranational legal order, beyond the original wording of the Treaties of Rome through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Whereas scholars have analyzed the evolution of EU case law and its implications, only very recent historical scholarship has examined how the Member States received this process in the context of a number of difficult political and economic crises for the integration process. This paper investigates how the national level dealt with these fundamental transformations in the European legal system. Specifically, it examines one of the Union's most important member states, the Federal Republic of Germany. Faced with a huge number of cases dealing with European law, German judges dealt with the supremacy of European law very cautiously, negotiating between increasingly polarized academic, public and ministerial debates on the question throughout the 1960s. By the mid 1970s, the German Constitutional Court famously limited the power of the ECJ in its Solange decision (1974). This was an expression of a broader discourse in Germany from 1968 onwards about the qualitative nature of democracy and participation in public life and was in some aspects a marker, at which the German elites felt comfortable expressing the value of their national constitutional system on the European stage. This paper examines the political, media and academic build up and response to the Constitutional Court's decision in the 1970s, arguing that the national "reception" is central to understanding the dynamics and evolution of European Union legal history.