Why an ESM programme could be a kiss of death: Recovery values and subordination. CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2012

Spain, needing a bailout for its banks, was granted a vague promise by EZ leaders for up to €100 billion. The details remain obscure, yet they matter enormously. This column argues that the so-called ‘subordination effect’ of fresh official lending could put Spain on the slippery road to ruin. It argues that if sovereign bonds must be bought, this should be done in the secondary market which, would be on an equal footing with private investors and thus avoid the subordination trap.

An incomplete step toward a banking union. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2012

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros applauds the decision taken by Europe’s leaders at the eurozone summit at the end of June to transfer responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank. It represents explicit recognition of the important fact that problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they can quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system. In his view, the next small, incremental step, although one not yet officially acknowledged, will necessarily be the creation of a common bank rescue fund.

Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

A simple model of multiple equilibria and default. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 16 July 2012

This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.

Can Italy and Spain survive rates of 6-7%? CEPS Policy Brief No. 279, 27 July 2012

The sentiment that the euro is now in real danger is based in large part on the widespread conviction that interest rates of 6-7% are simply unsustainable for both Italy and Spain., After taking a closer look at the fundamentals, however, Daniel Gros concludes in this new Policy Brief that both countries should be able to live with this level of interest rates for quite some time, but only if they mobilize domestic savings, which remain strong in both countries. For Spain, some debt/equity swaps are also needed.

Adjusting to a credit cycle bust: The role of fiscal policy. CEPS Commentary, 27 July 2012

In response to the often-heard accusation that “austerity is killing growth in Europe”, Daniel Gros asks in this new Commentary: “What austerity?” Looking at the entire budget cycle, he finds that the picture of austerity killing growth simply does not hold up. Since the bursting of the bubble in 2007, Gros reports that the economic performance of the US has been very similar to that of the euro area: GDP per capita is today about 2% below the 2007 level on both sides of the Atlantic; and the unemployment rate has increased by about the same amount as well: it increased by 3% both in the US and the euro area. Thus, he concludes that over a five-year period, the US has not done any better than the euro area although it has used a much larger dose of fiscal expansion.

European deposit insurance: financing the transition. CEPS Commentary, 6 September 2012

Arguing that the planned move to put the ECB in charge of banking supervision would be incomplete without a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA), Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker spell out in a new CEPS Commentary some underlying principles to guide a gradual transition under which only future risks would be shared while past losses would remain at the national level. They show that ultimately such a new institution would serve as a genuine source of confidence in the European banking system.

This recovery is different. CEPS Commentary 6 September 2012

The misguided belief that “this time is different” led policy-makers to permit the credit boom of the early 2000s to continue for too long, thus preparing the ground for the biggest financial crisis in living memory. But when it comes to the recovery this around, CEPS Director Daniel Gros argues in this Commentary that the belief that this time should not be different might be equally dangerous.

The implications for the EU and national budgets of the use of EU instruments for macro-financial stability. CEPS Special Report, 4 September 2012

The euro crisis has forced member states and the EU institutions to create a series of new instruments to safeguard macro-financial stability of the Union. This study describes the status of existing instruments, the role of the European Parliament and how the use of the instruments impinges on the EU budget also through their effects on national budgets. In addition, it presents a survey of other possible instruments that have been proposed in recent years (e.g. E-bonds and eurobonds), in order to provide an assessment of how EU macro-financial stability assistance could evolve in the future and what could be its impact on EU public finances.

A sovereign wealth fund to lift Germany's curse of excess savings. CEPS Policy Brief No. 280, 28 August 2012

As an alternative to the present system of intermediation of the German savings surplus, this paper suggests that the risk-adjusted rate of return could be improved by creating a sovereign wealth fund for Germany (designated DESWF), which could invest excess German savings globally. Such a DESWF would offer German savers a secure vehicle paying a guaranteed positive minimum real interest rate, with a top-up when real investment returns allowed. The vehicle would invest the funds in a portfolio that is highly diversified by geography and asset classes. Positive real returns can be expected in the long run based on positive real global growth. Since, in this case, a significant amount of funds would flow outside the euro area, the euro would depreciate, which would help crisis countries presently struggling to revive growth through exports and to close their external deficits so as to recoup their international credit-worthiness. Target imbalances would gradually disappear and German claims abroad would move from nominal claims on the ECB to diversified real and nominal claims on various private and public foreign entities in a variety of asset classes.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

Banking Union: Ireland vs. Nevada, an illustration of the importance of an integrated banking system. CEPS Commentary, 18 October 2012

Despite their surprising similarities – in size and their housing booms – Ireland and the American state of Nevada sharply parted company when it came to who bore responsibility for bailing out their failed banks when the booms turned to bust. This latest Commentary by Daniel Gros vividly illustrates the importance of that difference and thus the shock-absorbing capacity of an integrated banking system and a banking union.

Should Europe be fracking? CEPS Commentary, 5 October 2012

Underlining the fact that shale gas, like all natural resources, can only be used once, Daniel Gros observes in this CEPS Commentary that the real issue is not whether this resource should be developed in Europe, but when it should be used: today or tomorrow? Europe is already a heavy user of gas, but its consumption is stagnating (along with its economy). Despite the hype about the shale gas revolution, the extraction cost of (onshore) conventional gas remains below that of fracking. And lots of pipelines have already been built so that the marginal cost of bringing this ‘conventional’ gas to Europe is thus rather low. Thus, from an economic and environmental point of view, Gros argues that fracking is unlikely to bring large benefits for Europe and that shale gas might just substitute for conventional gas, which is plentiful.

What distinguishes the euro crisis from a ‘normal’ financial crisis? CEPS Commentary, 6 November 2012

This Commentary attempts to discern the distinguishing features between the present euro crisis and the financial crisis brought on in the US by the subprime lending disaster and the ensuing collapse of banks and other financial institutions in 2007-08. It finds that whereas the US was able to bring its crisis to an end by socialising the dubious debt and stabilising its valuation so that it could migrate to other investors capable of bearing the risk, this pattern can be only partly repeated in the eurozone, where both debt socialisation and a return to normal risk assessment are more problematic.. It concludes, nevertheless, that the crisis should now abate somewhat given that most risk-averse institutions have by now sold their holdings of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt and especially in light of the ECB’s assurances that it will not allow the euro to disintegrate.

How to deal with macroeconomic imbalances? CEPS Special Report No. 69, 23 November 2012

Lax financial conditions can foster credit booms. The global credit boom of the last decade led to large capital flows across the world, including large movements of resources from the northern countries of the euro area towards the southern part. Since the start of the crisis and more markedly after 2009, these flows have suddenly stopped, creating severe adjustment pressure. At this point the common monetary policy can only try to mitigate the unavoidable adjustment by maintaining overall financial stability. The challenge is to strike a delicate balance between providing liquidity for solvent institutions while keeping the overall pressure on for a rapid correction of the imbalances.