6 resultados para Gold.
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.
Resumo:
Foreword. Climate change is bad news for water resources – and thus for human development, societies, economies, the environment, and local and global security. The increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods serves as a reminder of the effects climate change can have on the quantity and quality of global water reserves, and thus on various other aspects of life. Even though the effects differ from region to region, this is a global challenge with far-reaching consequences to which Europe is not immune. As the world leaders gather in Paris in December 2015 to discuss a new international climate deal, it is worth to remind politicians, businesses and citizens of the water challenge and its wider implications, which already affect us today – and which will only get worse with climate change. However, water-related risks resulting from climate change are not a fatality and damage control doesn’t have to be the only mantra. Placing the water challenge at the centre of political and security dialogues, development strategies and climate mitigation and adaptation measures, and implementing smarter water management, could also bring great economic, environmental and social benefits, in and outside the European Union. It would also contribute to global security. Water matters – now more than ever. This is also what this publication demonstrates. Building on the European Policy Centre’s, two-year “Blue Gold project, this publication shows the rationale for action, how the EU could use its existing internal and external policy instruments to tackle the water challenge with its various dimensions and the benefits of action.
