China's ETS: A vote of confidence in carbon markets ahead of Paris. CEPS Commentary, 12 October 2015

In this CEPS commentary, Andrei Marcu welcomes the recent announcement by President Xi Jinping that China will start a national emissions trading scheme in 2017. Calling it a "genuine game changer" in the global climate talks, Marcu describes the decision as giving a much-needed boost to carbon markets and cap-and-trade as the preferred way forward for those economies that have the capacity, the depth and the breadth for a liquid carbon market.

Carbon Market Opportunities in Southern Mediterranean Countries. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 8/March 2012

To date, Southern Mediterranean countries have hosted a limited number of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). There are three challenges to the participation of middleincome countries in future carbon markets: the limited size of future demand for offsets or credits; restrictions on the use of CDM credits in Phase III of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme; and the lack of prompt preparation for the start of new market-based mechanisms. This study examines existing and emerging activities in Southern Mediterranean countries that could fit into new market based mechanisms. It explores options for the evolution of mechanisms and discusses the merits of post-2012 carbon funds in bridging the gap between the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the entry into force of a new international agreement.

The Role of Market Mechanisms in a Post-2020 Climate Change Agreement. CEPS Special Report No. 87/May 2014

This special report is intended to serve as a background briefing document for the European Climate Platform seminar on Carbon Markets in the 2015 Agreement: Role and Architecture, but also raises issues of more enduring relevance in the wider debate about market mechanisms and the next climate change agreement. The paper looks at the relationship between the carbon market and a new climate change agreement, to be finalised in Paris in 2015. It tries to answer two key questions: does the carbon market have a role to play in a post-2020 agreement, and what is the role of a post-2020 agreement in the creation and operation of a carbon market? Introduction. The world has changed in many ways since 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, along some critical axes, both from an economic and emissions points of view. Moreover, and this cannot be quantified, the appetite for global governance, especially for an agreement with such far-reaching implications as a climate change agreement, has diminished considerably. This paper looks at the relationship between the carbon market and a new climate change agreement, to be finalised in Paris in 2015. It tries to answer two key questions: does the carbon market have a role to play in a post-2020 agreement, and what is the role of a post-2020 agreement in the creation and operation of a carbon market?

The EU ETS: Caught between an ideal and reality. CEPS Commentary, 8 march 2016

The EU ETS (emissions trading system) has passed its first decade of operation and has proven to be an inspiration for those who promote carbon pricing through carbon markets as a means to tackle climate change. During this period, Europe has learned important lessons from operating its own ETS and from observing the experiences of other jurisdictions with carbon markets.

Reforming the Market Design of EU Electricity Markets: Addressing the Challenges of a Low-Carbon Power Sector. CEPS Task Force Report, 27 July 2015

This CEPS Task Force Report focuses on whether there is a need to adapt the EU’s electricity market design and if so, the options for doing so. In a first step, it analyses the current market trends by distinguishing between their causes and their consequences. Then, the current blueprint of EU power market design – the target model – is briefly introduced, followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of the current approach and the challenges in finding suitable solutions. The final chapter offers an inventory of solutions differentiating between recommendations shared among Task Force members and non-consensual options.

Relaunching the European Retail Finance Market: Comments on the Commission's Green Paper. ECRI Commentary No. 20, 15 December 2015

The European Commission’s Green Paper on retail financial services, published on December 10th, provides valuable insights into the possible benefits of a single market, as well as the obstacles to its development and the possible remedies. While a greater diversity of products within countries could have a positive impact on both consumers and providers, it is also important to highlight that it could contribute to more effective macroeconomic policies at European level. The development of such a single market for Europe where consumers can confidently purchase more profitable financial products abroad necessitates the establishment of a European body along the lines of the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), or at least the establishment of closer European supervisory cooperation and enforcement. A framework for the digitalisation of financial services should not only focus on mitigating specific types of risk, such as cyber insecurity, lack of privacy and financial exclusion, but it should also continue to maintain a “space of creation” for innovative financial firms.

Can border carbon taxes fit into the global trade regime? Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/06, 9 December 2013

One complement to domestic climate policies could be the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions arising during the production of imported products. Such ‘border carbon adjustments’ (BCAs) are said to have several benefits, but are also severely criticised. This Policy Brief highlights some weaknesses in the standard argumentation for BCAs. But there is an alternative argument for border carbon measures, based on the fact that countries expose each other to climate externalities. The reformulated argument is economically more convincing, and provides a more convincing justification for the extraterritorial feature of border carbon measures. However, there are also several important factors mitigating against the implementation of such measures, including the risk that these measures will be used for protectionism. One complement to domestic climate policies could be the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions arising during the production of imported products. Such ‘border carbon adjustments’ (BCAs) are said to have several benefits, but are also severely criticised. This Policy Brief highlights some weaknesses in the standard argumentation for BCAs. But there is an alternative argument for border carbon measures, based on the fact that countries expose each other to climate externalities. The reformulated argument is economically more convincing, and provides a more convincing justification for the extraterritorial feature of border carbon measures. However, there are also several important factors mitigating against the implementation of such measures, including the risk that these measures will be used for protectionism.

Carbon leakage: an overview. CEPS Special Report No. 79, 6 December 2013

Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on climate policy, given the confluence of issues that are currently being debated, including the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework and the review of the EU carbon leakage list by 2014. Carbon leakage is the result of asymmetrical carbon policies, especially carbon pricing, and the resulting carbon cost, which affects the international competitive position of some EU industry and could displace production and/or investment, and the emissions of the activities displaced. This paper identifies the difference between carbon price and carbon cost to leakage exposed industry as one of two fundamental issues to be understood and addressed; lack of visibility on future climate policies and anti-leakage provisions is the other key issue. While this is a global issue, most of the experience has been accumulated in the EU. Carbon leakage is only one of the factors that could affect the competitive position of sectors, but it is difficult to attribute the impact of carbon costs versus other variables such as energy costs, labour, etc. Studies have predicted the risk of a significant amount of production leakage in a number of energy-intensive industries. To address the danger, they were included in the EU ETS carbon leakage list, which gave them access to free allowances. However, a limited number of studies undertaken after the end of the second trading period (2012) show little evidence of production leakage and asks the question whether the issue has not been blown out of proportion. The paper argues that the past may not be a good representation of the future, as it was heavily influenced by a high level of free allocation, the exceptional economic downturn, CO2 prices significantly below what was anticipated, as well as the potential for changes in some fundamental variables such as the shrinking pool of allowances available for free allocation. It emphasises the need for a well-informed debate in the EU on measures to address carbon leakage post-2020, underpinned by a number of options, and objective criteria to evaluate those options. It emphasises that the debate should cover both investment and production leakage, caused by both direct and indirect carbon costs.

Carbon Leakage: Options for the EU. CEPS Special Report, March 2014

This CEPS Special Report builds on the first deliverable of the project entitled “Carbon leakage: Options for the EU”. It identifies carbon costs, and the ability to pass through carbon costs, as the main risk factors that could lead from asymmetrical carbon policies to carbon leakage. It also outlines and evaluates, based on criteria discussed in the paper, options for detecting and mitigating the risk of carbon leakage in three jurisdictions, with special attention to the EU ETS (Emissions Trading Scheme). Based on the analysis of approaches currently used in a number of existing carbon pricing systems, it identifies the balance between the number of sectors identified as being at risk, and the amount of compensation provided as a risk mitigation measure, as the critical element in providing an optimum approach to address carbon leakage risks. It also identifies a risk-based approach to identifying sectors at risk as allowing for a better reflection of reality in a counterfactual argument. Finally, the paper concludes that while, with some exceptions, there has been limited carbon leakage until now, the past may not be a good reflection of the future and that measures need to be put in place for the post-2020 period. While examining a number of approaches, it identifies free allocation as the most likely way forward for mitigating the risk of carbon leakage. While other approaches may provide interesting options, they also present challenges for implementation, from a market functioning, to international trade and relations, points of view. A number of challenges will need to be addressed in the post-2020 period, with many of them part of the EU ETS structural reform package. Some of these challenges include, among others, the need to recognise, and provide for individual sectoral characteristics, as well as for changes in production patterns, due to economic cycles, and other factors. Finally, the paper emphasises the need for an open dialogue regarding the post-2020 provisions for carbon leakage as no overall Energy and Climate Package is likely to be agreed on until this matter is addressed.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

The Penetration of Financial Instability in Agricultural Credit and Leveraging. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 2, September 2011

This paper describes the aggregate rural capital markets of the EU and the main differences between the markets of its member countries. The results of our study suggest that the agricultural credit markets are still quite segmented and the segments are country- rather than currency- or region specific. Financial instability in Europe is also penetrating the agricultural sector and the variation of interest rates for agricultural credit is increasing across countries. Perhaps the most dramatic signal of growing financial instability is that the financial leverage (gearing rate) of European farms rose in 2008 by almost 4 percentage points, from 14 to 18%. The 4 percentage-point annual rise was twice the 2 percentage-point rise observed during the economic recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The distribution of the financial leverage of agriculture across countries does not, however, reflect the distribution of country-specific risk premiums in the manner that they are observed in government bond yields. Therefore, in those countries that have the weakest financial situation in the public sector and in which the bond markets are encumbered with high country-specific risk premiums, the agricultural sector is not directly exposed to a very large risk of increasing interest rates, since it is not so highly leveraged. For example in Greek and Spanish agriculture, the financial leverage (gearing) rate is only 0.6% and 2.2% respectively, while the highest gearing rates are found elsewhere (in Denmark), reaching 50%.

Drivers of Agricultural Physical Capital Development: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 18, February 2012

This paper aims to identify drivers of physical capital adjustments in agriculture. It begins with a review of some of the most important theories and modelling approaches regarding firms’ adjustments of physical capital, ranging from output-based models to more recent approaches that consider irreversibility and uncertainty. Thereafter, it is suggested that determinants of physical capital adjustments in agriculture can be divided into three main groups, namely drivers related to: i) expected (risk-adjusted) profit, ii) expected societal benefits and costs and iii) expected private nonpecuniary benefits and costs. The discussion that follows focuses on the determinants belonging to the first group and covers aspects related to product market conditions, technological conditions, financial conditions and the role of firm structure and organization. Furthermore, the role of subjective beliefs is emphasized. The main part of this paper is concerned with the demand side of the physical capital market and one section also briefly discusses some aspects related to supply of farm assets.

Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013

This paper describes and compares the institutional framework of the agricultural credit markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in situations where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries. The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. The financial experts all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed.

Green, Pink & Silver? The Future of Labour in Europe, Vol. 2. CEPS Paperback, 3 March 2015

Work is both an essential part of our daily lives and one of the major policy concerns across Europe. In this second volume of The Future of Labour in Europe, the authors explain in accessible language the findings of the NEUJOBS project on the job prospects of key industries and groups of people. They use three colours – green, pink and silver – to pinpoint areas with the largest challenges as well as the greatest potential. The conclusions are addressed to policy-makers, the business world, journalists, fellow academics and to anyone interested in the shape, size and character of the labour markets of tomorrow.

Capital Markets Union: a vision for the long term. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/05 April 2015

Capital Markets Union (CMU) is a welcome initiative. It could augment economic risk sharing, set the right conditions for more dynamic development of risk capital for high-growth firms and improve choices and returns for savers. This offers major potential for benefits in terms of jobs, growth and financial resilience. • CMU cannot be a short-term cyclical instrument to replace subdued bank lending, because financial ecosystems change slowly. Shifting financial intermediation towards capital markets and increasing cross-border integration will require action on multiple fronts, including increasing the transparency, reliability and comparability of information and addressing financial stability concerns. Some quick wins might be available but CMU’s real potential can only be achieved with a long-term structural policy agenda. • To sustain the current momentum, the EU should first commit to a limited number of key reforms, including more integrated accounting enforcement and supervision of audit firms. Second, it should set up autonomous taskforces to prepare proposals on the more complex issues: corporate credit information, financial infrastructure, insolvency, financial investment taxation and the retrospective review of recent capital markets regulation. The aim should be substantial legislative implementation by the end of the current EU parliamentary term.