Der Prozess der europäischen Integration in Belgien Voraussetzung und Rahmen der Föderalisiserung eines ehemaligen = Process of European integration in Belgium; Condition and framework of a former [Föderalisiserung]. Research Papers in Law, 2/2003

No abstract.

Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6

What Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Regarding Subsidiarity within the EU Institutional Framework?

he principle of subsidiarity refers in general to the choice of the most suitable and efficient level for taking policy action. The European Union associates subsidiarity with the way of taking decisions ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’, as it is referred to in the EU treaties. Thus, ensuring the respect of subsidiarity within the EU legislative framework ensures that any EU action is justified when proposing draft legislative acts. The Lisbon Treaty establishes new mechanisms reinforcing subsidiarity control, both ex ante and ex post the EU legislative process, and by doing so, enhances mainly the role of the national parliaments (and to a lesser extent the regional parliaments) and the Committee of the Regions. But in the end, this is a way of ensuring legitimacy of the EU action as it is quite often questioned, especially in times of crisis. Years of practice will tell whether the words will join reality.

Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008

Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).